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THE Nation

AMERICA'S LEADING LIBERAL WEEKLY SINCE 1865

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The Shape of Things

IT IS NOT ENOUGH TO SAY, AS EVERY EDITOR and columnist has said since last Sunday, that "patience and firmness" had their reward in Russia's conciliatory moves on the eve of the Security Council meeting. The point was obvious and well taken. What is equally clear, but less generally emphasized, is the need for a continuing policy to implement the purposes expressed by Secretary Byrnes. Firmness means nothing if it implies only a stand against Russian provocations. Patience very easily collapses into aloofness. We saw what happened when Mr. Byrnes walked out on the UNO meeting in London, leaving Mr. Stettinius with no directives and no policy. The bitter tug-of-war that followed well-nigh ended the United Nations. Firmness and patience must be clothed in action: positive action aimed to forestall conflicts still in the future. As one example, we have the looming issue of the Straits and Russia's relations to Turkey. As another, we have the profound division of policy and procedure in Germany. As a third and fourth we have Spain and Argentina. All these clamor for preventive action by a world organization set up to eliminate threats to security. We hope the Council will not relax in its new-found atmosphere of conciliation but will make good use of the breathing spell it has been granted.

*

THE FRENCH HAVE BEEN MANEUVERED INTO a nasty position by the refusal of Britain and the United States to agree to bring the issue of Franco Spain before the Security Council. The State Department, in spite of its own recent document proving the intricate and continuing relationship between Franco and the Nazis, now adopts the oddly inconsistent attitude that the Spanish dictatorship is not a threat to peace and security. France still remains unconvinced but hesitates to defy its Western allies, especially at a moment when it is looking to Washington for food supplies and a desperately needed loan. On the other hand, if no action is taken beyond the rather pompous exhortation contained in the three-power note, the French government will find itself holding a very hot potato. Its left parties, especially the Communists, are determined that official disapproval of Franco be expressed in steps leading to his overthrow. If the government fails to raise the issue at New York, and especially if it is driven to reopen the Spanish border, it will face a tough internal struggle. If M. Bonnet is empowered to act, he can count on the support of at least five other delegations and force the Anglo-American partners either to support him or explain to the world their curious reluctance to take measures to oust Franco. The latter they could ill afford to do. As the Council opened its first session a group of liberal American organizations, on the initiative of the Nation Associates, submitted a memorandum demanding that the Council urge members of the United Nations to sever diplomatic and commercial relations with Franco and to recognize a provisional Republican government.

*

MEANWHILE THE MAKE-UP OF THE SPANISH government in exile has been partly modified by the resignation of de los Rios as Foreign Minister and the inclusion of Santiago Carrillo, former youth leader and a member of the executive committee of the Communist Party, and two representatives of minor groups. Last Sunday at Toulouse Communist leader Antonio Mije made public the decision of his party to participate in the Giral Cabinet and expressed the hope that other Republican groups and leaders would come in later. Although no names were mentioned it was clear that Mije was referring particularly to Negrín and del Vayo. But the very tone of the announcement was an admission that the problem of creating a broadly inclusive Cabinet remains unsettled. Negrín and del Vayo will not now join for the reasons given in Del Vayo's *Nation* article last week. They believe only a thorough reorganization, not the mere inclusion of a couple of additional party representatives, can create a government strong enough to direct the struggle for Republican restoration. As regards

COMING IN *THE NATION*

LABOR KALEIDOSCOPE

In the pause between strike waves

Robert Bendiner

reports on the current pattern of labor in politics and politics in labor

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Giral, he must be very unhappy to have the Communists in and de los Rios out but it was the only way of prolonging the existence of his government which shows no sign of developing the vitality demanded by the crisis in Spain's international situation.

*

A GENERAL STRIKE IN CRETE—ALWAYS A republican stronghold—is the latest move of the Greek left wing in its campaign to force postponement of the elections scheduled for March 31. It is claimed that under present conditions a representative vote is impossible owing to the widespread falsification of the registration lists and the intimidation carried on by royalist organizations under the protection of the police. While the British Foreign Office has shut its eyes to these conditions, most independent observers agree that outside Athens right-wing terrorism is rampant. Seymour Friedin of the New York *Herald Tribune*, returning from a thousand-mile tour through the Peloponnesus and Epirus, has reported that the monarchist organization known as "X," which is responsible for a constantly increasing number of beatings, kidnappings, and murders, has suppressed all open activity by the republicans. Expressing the opinion that the demand for postponement of elections was justified, Mr. Friedin added: "If Bevin took an unconducted tour of only the Peloponnesus he might begin to question the veracity of the sweetness-and-light reports which have been channeled through the Foreign Office." There is reason to believe that Prime Minister Sophoulis, who since the left and center members of his Cabinet resigned some weeks ago has headed an utterly unrepresentative rump administration, would like to postpone the elections. But he is taking his orders from Downing Street, which, having foolishly involved its prestige in this election question, is obstinately insisting that the vote be taken on the announced date. If the result is a new wave of violence in Greece, Mr. Bevin's responsibility will be a heavy one.

*

WITHOUT FANFARE THE INDO-CHINESE problem has shifted from a primarily military to a political plane. On March 6, the French signed a preliminary pact recognizing the nationalist Republic of Viet Nam (Indo-China) as a "free state within the Indo-Chinese Federation and French union." A referendum will be held to determine whether the Indo-Chinese provinces of Tongking, Annam, and Cochin-China will become part of the republic whose right to have its own parliament, army, and finances has been recognized. France will be responsible for external security, and French troops may stay in Tonkin and Annam for five years, but internal security will be the responsibility of the Indo-Chinese. The French have gone beyond the Dutch and British in recognizing a nationalist regime, but largely

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because circumstances forced them to do so. Unlike the Dutch in Indonesia, the French had British support in suppressing nationalists only in the South: in the North the Chinese allowed the Annamites to flourish under their occupation as a means of pressing the French to give up extraterritorial rights in China, make Haiphong a free port, and permit the Chinese to buy up the Chinese end of the strategic French-owned Yunnan-Indo-China railway. Once the French gave in to these demands, Chungking began removing its troops. While under China's protection, however, the nationalists had succeeded in strengthening their position and clothing it with legality through an election. The French were confronted with a choice between a difficult and bloody military reconquest or a political compromise. They decided to compromise. Canny President Ho Chi-minh has called for an immediate opening of final negotiations in Paris, knowing he can win more for Indo-China from leftist officials in Paris than from reactionary colonial officials in the field.

*

THE DIVISION OF GERMANY INTO FOUR zones under the control of four different governments may have been expedient from the military point of view. It was and remains fantastic from any other, but Germany at the moment does provide a microcosm in which the differences—and the divergences—among the United Nations may be studied. The Soviet in its zone has thrown its support openly and ruthlessly to the Communist Party. The news that Social Democrats who oppose the merger with the Communist Party are subject to arrest and detention at Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen is ugly both as symbol and as fact. On the other hand the Russians have divided up estates and given land to landless Germans. The British and French are unofficially supporting the Social Democrats and the Socialist organizations of Western Europe are reportedly lending a hand in formulating policies. "Of the occupying powers," says a news dispatch, "only the United States is remaining entirely neutral." And there's the rub. For this neutrality too often represents simply the lack of a positive democratic policy. The Russian persecution of Social Democrats should be protested by the other occupying powers, but the only effective protest—which does not seem, alas, to be forthcoming—would be a drive, especially an American drive, for a genuine democratic solution, both economic and political, as dynamic as the Russian drive for its monolithic brand of social change.



America's Obligation

THE NATION whole-heartedly indorses the appeal sent to President Truman by representatives of twenty national organizations at the UNRRA conference in Atlantic City. The appeal describes the voluntary measures relied upon by the so-called Emergency Famine Committee as "insufficient" to cope with the world food crisis. It asks that the United States government "immediately set aside at the source greater amounts of those foods required for overseas relief." It supports the recommendation of the retiring Director General of the UNRRA, Herbert H. Lehman, that rationing be reinstituted on cereals, fats, and oils, which are desperately needed elsewhere. We hope the influential organizations signing the appeal, which include the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the National Grange, and the General Federation of Women's Clubs, will follow it up with a campaign of mass pressure on the White House and the Department of Agriculture. Literally, millions of lives depend upon our action.

Big food, industrial, and farming interests are fighting hard against a real program to mobilize supplies for the hungry. They have powerful allies in the Department of Agriculture and in Herbert Hoover. The 1946 bumper-crop estimates put out by the department were intended to take the steam out of the drive against famine, but these estimates were based purely on acreage figures, and even bumper crops will not make drastic measures unnecessary if cereals are again to be consumed by livestock instead of being made available for export. Mr. Hoover's recent statement to the press in Paris is doubly misleading, first, because the crisis is not a mere matter of the next few months but will almost certainly still be with us next winter, and secondly, because his opposition to reimposed rationing on the ground that the American people's voluntary generosity will be more effective is nonsense. The American people may be as generous as they like, but as long as no mandatory action is taken to stop the diversion of foodstuffs to livestock, luxury food products, fancy soaps and cosmetics, and other industrial uses, their voluntary abstinence will make only a belated and inadequate contribution.

The debate over rationing must not distract attention

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from more immediate measures; rationing takes time to set up. *The Nation* indorses the excellent suggestions recently put forward by Food for Freedom, which has been doing a noble job on the anti-famine front. We need first of all set-aside orders on flour and wheat for export, and larger set-aside orders on lard and other fats; only recently and with respect to meats has the Secretary of Agriculture used his power to issue set-aside orders at all firmly and fully. We need orders cutting bread production by bakers at least 20 per cent and cake production at least 50 per cent; the latter would also save fats. We need to boost the extraction rate of wheat above the present 80 per cent; every 5 per cent increase means 10,000,000 bushels of wheat saved, or 650,000,000 loaves of bread. Steps must be taken to get hoarded grain on the market; perhaps an export subsidy may be necessary. Limits on ice cream, the fat content of soaps, and the industrial use of linseed oil would be helpful. Most of all, the Department of Agriculture must be pushed into drastic action to cut down our expanded herds of livestock, which eat the cereals human beings need. We must pay in food the debt we owe our Allies abroad, to whom war brought not prosperity but death and devastation. That is America's obligation.

What Ottawa Revealed

THE Canadian espionage case has brought into clear view a situation much more serious than the betrayal of certain secret information by Canadian scientists and civil servants to agents of the Soviet Union. The immediate effect of the revelations has been a heightening of the Soviet-Western Powers tension. Apart from the drastic suspension of the civil rights of those involved, which has occasioned strong parliamentary criticism, the Canadian government appears to have taken the only course of action open to it under the circumstances. The Soviet charge that the whole matter was simply a cooked-up anti-Soviet plot is palpable nonsense. On the other hand, the outburst of vehement protest against the intricate schemes of the Soviet embassy in Ottawa is a little hypocritical. Perhaps if the N. K. V. D. were as smart as the R. C. M. P., the shoe would be on the other foot. Espionage is an accepted part of the diplomacy of all modern nations.

This brings us to the more serious implications of the Canadian case. It appears from the report of the Royal Commission investigating several of those accused of espionage that the Soviet Union was attempting to acquire carefully guarded military information in Canada as early as 1942, that is, long before the Manhattan Project was put into full operation. That means that the boasted cooperation between Russia and the Western allies was an arm's-length affair. Three separate wars, in fact, were being fought simultaneously—the American–British Commonwealth war in Western Europe, the Russian war in Eastern Europe, and the American-British war in the Pacific. The Russian armies were supplied by enormous quantities of lend-lease material from the United States and Canada. There was doubtless a certain amount of global strategy mapped out at Big Three conferences. But there was no real sharing of war effort. The Russians refused our military experts access to their secrets and even kept our military correspondents at a safe distance from the front line. We did our best—apparently not a very adequate best—to keep our secrets from the Russians by hedging them around with every precaution and making their divulgence a top crime. The policy of secrecy on the atomic bomb is but a continuation of the policy of secrecy—against the Russians as well as against our enemies—that prevailed throughout the war. It is almost as if a third world war were in the cradle while the second was being fought.

Now the lesson to be learned from the spy revelations is not, as some persons, including Major General Groves, would have us believe, to guard our secrets even more jealously and improve our espionage and counter-espionage. It is rather that this secret-guarding policy, which is part of an international arms race, is bound to fail. The slight edge we might have at the time the prizes are passed around will not be noticeable to the population of our great cities, who will be mostly dead. The Russians, who by that time may, in keeping with the same logic of nationalistic security, be spread over most of Europe, will perhaps survive in larger number even if the Soviet Union itself is effectively destroyed.

But beyond this immediate lesson in the logic of current strategy there is the more basic lesson that our only national security lies in more effective international controls. For us that means placing the military control of the atomic bomb firmly in the hands of a suitable agency of the United Nations, getting the domestic control out of military hands and into civilian hands, stopping manufacture of bombs and destroying those already made, and generally strengthening the prestige of the UNO. For the Russians, it means abandoning the policy of pushing out zones of strategic defense beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union, which, as Walter Lippmann points out, may have been valuable strategy in the land war the Russians won but which wouldn't be worth a damn in the long-range atomic war to come. Meanwhile, of course, that policy weakens the authority of the UNO and confirms the military leaders of the West in their suicidal folly. If we can't change our premises, then the logic of our contemporary international dealings spells doom for all of us. Only if we make the basic shift from national to international security strategy, shall we have a chance to work out a good part of our salvation. We may even put the disciples of E. Phillips Oppenheim out of business and bring back the detective story to the domestic field where it belongs.

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UNRRA's Battle

BY I. F. STONE

Atlantic City, March 24

THE most enlightening document made public at the fourth session of the UNRRA Council was a hitherto "restricted" report by its Bureau of Supply. Governor Lehman, who seems intent on making a fighting exit as Director General, made it available to the press over British opposition. The document shows the stepchild treatment accorded UNRRA by the Anglo-American-Canadian Combined Food Board, which controls the disposition of most of the world's surplus foodstuffs. It also discloses the unfair handling of the Soviet Union's very modest requests in the food field. And it indicates that commercial and political considerations play no slight role in the work of the CFB.

The Bureau of Supply report reveals that despite sharp cuts in the allocation of fats and oils to UNRRA countries large quantities are being allocated to non-food uses in the United States and the United Kingdom. During the last six months of 1945 UNRRA was able to obtain and ship only 73,000 tons, though its requirements were 306,000 tons. This year UNRRA needs a minimum of 798,409 tons, but its total allocation is only 171,000, or less than one-fourth its requirements. One way the Combined Food Board cut UNRRA's allocation was to throw out altogether the requests by the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Soviet Republics for 149,000 tons of fats and oils. The board's excuse was that its requests for certain data on indigenous production, stocks, proposed levels of consumption, and imports had not been met. UNRRA objected that in the case of some countries—Albania, Austria, Byelorussia, China, the Dodecanese Islands, Finland, Italy, and the Ukrainian Soviet Republic—"a quantitative justification" was "considered quite unnecessary." UNRRA said the amounts asked for these claimants was so small that "the subtraction from any reasonable consumption standard of the estimated indigenous production would produce import requirements from each of these countries greatly in excess of our allocation requests." The Ukrainian delegate pointed out that the fats requested for his country totaled only four and one-half pounds per capita, and the delegate of the U. S. S. R. called attention to the fact that the Combined Food Board's allocation of fats and oils to Spain and Portugal (122,000 tons) was not much less than that allocated to all twelve UNRRA countries, which have an aggregate population many times as great as that of the Iberian Peninsula.

Though the Combined Food Board seems to be a stickler for figures in dealing with some countries, it does not always mind working in the dark. An appendix to the Bureau of Supply report contained a letter from the director of its food division to the fats and oils committee of the Combined Food Board. The letter dealt with linseed oil, which can be used for food as well as for soaps and paints. It said that of 365,000 tons of linseed oil to be obtained in 1946 from Argentina and Uruguay, 304,000 tons had been allocated to the United States, United Kingdom, Belgium, France, and the Netherlands, but only 3,000 tons to all the UNRRA countries. "You will recall," the letter said, "the shock with which we learned from you that the entire quantity of linseed to be imported by the United States and the United Kingdom is intended for non-food uses." The UNRRA food director said he "found it difficult to understand" the allocation of "enormous quantities of linseed for paint and other non-food uses" and asked for a breakdown of allocation figures showing intended use as between food and non-food for each country. The board's reply was that while "in view of the extreme world shortage every attempt should of course be made to maximize the quantities of fats and oils available for human consumption," it could not supply the figures because it was up to the individual governments to decide how they would use their fats allocation. This year the United Kingdom is getting 987,000 tons and the United States 306,000 tons of imported fats and oils, largely for industrial use, while most countries are literally starving for fats.

I had heard from several sources in Washington that one of UNRRA's difficulties was its dependence on the "industry-minded" commodity chief of the Department of Agriculture. It is not without interest to note the background of William H. Jasspon, chairman of the CFB's fats and oils committee. Jasspon is also director of the oilseeds division of the Commodity Credit Corporation and chief of the fats and oils branch of the Office of Distribution, War Food Administration. At the same time he is president of the Perkins Oil Company of Memphis, Tennessee, and an official of the National Cotton Council. To a man from the vegetable-oil industry, the resumption of normal trade in selling oil to paint, soap, and other companies may seem more important than it does to others in a time of world famine. "Industry-mindedness" is prevalent in other sectors of the food front, too. Thus Sir John Boyd Orr, head of the Food and Agriculture Organization, told UNRRA's committee on policy Wednesday that the prevention of such "huge unmarketable surpluses as occurred after World War I" was "as important for humanity as the solution of the more immediate problem of hunger in parts of the world." Only those enjoy-

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ing three meals a day will be able to appreciate Sir John's sturdy objectivity.

There is deep dissatisfaction here with Anglo-American handling of the relief problem, and a feeling that for political reasons ex-enemy or "neutral" countries are getting more consideration than Allied nations. Belgium and the Netherlands complain that UNRRA supplies for Central Europe are being routed through the ports of Hamburg and Bremen at the expense of Antwerp and Rotterdam. The Chinese complain that the British have cornered the Siamese rice supply, and that British-owned Hong Kong is being given almost as much as all the rest of China. The Russians, Poles, Czechs, and Yugoslavs accuse the Combined Food Board of playing politics at their expense. The Russians, after being given a run-around on fats and oils (they never asked for cereals), are now looked to for wheat. They have given 91,000 tons to the Poles (as compared with the 60,000 tons Poland has received from UNRRA) and 60,000 tons to the Czechs, and are now selling 400,000 tons of wheat and 100,000 tons of barley to France. If UNRRA would speed up promised seeds and agricultural machinery, the Ukraine might again become one of Europe's principal bread baskets. Lehman wants the U. S. S. R. to join the Combined Food Board, but neither the United States, the United Kingdom, nor Canada has done more than suggest that the Russians sit on the cereals subcommittee. In the meantime the Poles have introduced a resolution which would force the Combined Board to accept UNRRA's statement of requirements, to cut UNRRA's requests no more sharply than those of other claimants, and to let UNRRA have a voice in the determination of allocations made to it by the board. The issue is not very different from that before the UNO—whether we are to participate in a truly international organization or try to rule through an Anglo-American bloc.

Report on Argentina

BY FREDA KIRCHWEY

IF PERON had come to power through a coup or through fraudulent elections, as most intelligent onlookers—Mr. Braden, for example—expected, or if he had been defeated in honest elections, as a majority of Argentine democrats confidently hoped, the outlines of Argentina's political future would be clearer. But Perón confounded the prophets at home and abroad; he won in honest elections—technically honest, at any rate.* The first result of his victory is confusion and divided counsels in the ranks of the opposition. This was the single contingency for which no policy had been worked out in advance. When a people as democratic as the Argentines vote a fascist into power, the circumstance demands a careful explanation. Where did the prophets go wrong? Why was Perón elected? Only if they find the answer to those questions, can the defeated democrats of Argentina and their friends in the other American nations decide their future attitude and strategy.

During my short stay in Buenos Aires I talked to many Argentines—politicians, labor leaders, students, women active in the fight against Perón, and plain citizens—as well as some of my compatriots, including several newspaper men and women. I had a long session with Tamborini. I saw Cooke, the present Foreign Minister. On the basis of that short stay and those many talks I have come to one main conclusion about the election: the democratic forces were defeated—and were surprised by their defeat—because they had underestimated Perón's appeal to the "common man" in Argentina. But before I develop that opinion any farther, I want to say a few words about certain other more obvious factors contributing to Perón's victory and its results.

DEMOCRATIC BLUNDERS

Even before I left Buenos Aires the inquest was in full swing. It was generally agreed, for one thing, that the failure of the Democratic Union to support a single ticket for all offices was a mistake, although nobody knew how it could have been avoided. The union was formed only at the end of December, and only under pressure of campaign necessity. It never represented a solid anti-fascist front. Rather, it was an *ad hoc* coalition in which the Radicals demanded, as of right, the leading place. The other three parties in the union—the Socialists, Communists, and Progressive Democrats—agreed to support two Radical Party leaders, José Tamborini and Enrique P. Mosca, for President and Vice-President. The Union was united on these two offices only. The Communist and Progressive Democratic parties combined on a single slate for the other offices—senators, deputies, provincial posts; the Socialists and Radicals refused to join them. As a result the voters were confronted with three separate democratic lists of candidates for senators and deputies and three lists in the provincial elections. It was understood in advance that if the Tamborini-Mosca ticket won, the Cabinet would be solidly Radical; no other parties expected to be included.

All this being true, the smaller parties deserve great credit for the disinterested ardor they threw into the campaign; as do a great number of non-party groups and

* Although the final returns are not yet in, the election of Perón has been conceded by his opponent.

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individuals, chief among them the women and the students. Perhaps the Radicals, too, deserve credit for joining the union, even on such favorable terms. In the past they have considered themselves too strong to need allies; they are the one big national party, and it is their tradition that in a free election they always win. They recognized, though belatedly, that this time they faced a social struggle as well as an election, and so, after a fraction of the party had deserted to Perón (the Foreign Minister, Juan I. Cooke, was one of the dissidents), they decided to combine. But the sentiment of party sovereignty runs strong in Argentina, strong enough to have defeated any real collective security against fascism.

Then there is the question of the Conservatives. Today some people in Argentina are trying to explain the defeat by the fact that the Conservative Party was not a part of the Democratic Union, while the Communist Party was. This is nonsense, and dangerous nonsense. It may well be that the Conservatives, who were expected under a sort of gentlemen's agreement to vote the anti-Perón ticket, threw part of their support the other way. This would be quite plausible. For the Conservative Party, although it undoubtedly embraces many decent people, is the traditional party of fraud, the party of the "oligarchy," the party of Castillo, the party which bears responsibility for the pro-Nazi policy which Perón merely continued. To have brought this discredited organization into the Democratic Union would have been a travesty; as it was, the union carried a heavy enough burden of reactionaries. The mass vote that the democrats lost to Perón was the vote of the unskilled worker, the casual or migratory worker, the farm worker—the forgotten man in Argentina. It would hardly have helped win this following to have thrown out the Communists and drawn in the Conservatives, and those who think it would, have entirely missed the point of Perón's victory.

The democratic leaders made another mistake which affected not the election itself but its aftermath. As soon as the vote was cast they hurried into print with statements extolling the honesty of the election and thanking the army for defending it. Since the vote *was* honest, it was doubtless proper to say so. But if the democrats had not believed so wholeheartedly and prematurely in their own success, they would have qualified their enthusiasm by at least recalling the previous role of the army and the bloody incidents which had punctuated the campaign. By failing to do so in the hour of their supposed triumph, they abandoned a strategic point from which they could operate with good effect today. They have maneuvered themselves into a position which enabled the Foreign Minister to say to me with obvious satisfaction: "Of course the Democratic Union will accept the results of the election. They have already acknowledged that it was fair; they have congratulated the army. . . ." Today it is too late for them to ask whether any election can be called honest, no matter how scrupulously the votes are cast and counted, after two and a half years of repression followed by a campaign in which one side freely uses the police and other instruments of political power—not to speak of unlimited public funds—to push its cause. By brushing aside so casually the issue of fascist dictatorship, which alone had succeeded in uniting their ranks and against which they directed the whole weight of their pre-election fight, the Democratic Union made a blunder they and their friends abroad will have many occasions to regret.

CAMPAIGN OF TERROR

How much the period of terror reduced the chances of the democrats is hard to guess, for it worked both ways. The corruption and pro-Axis isolationism of Castillo's regime outraged the more enlightened public; it never produced a coalition of pro-Allied, democratic forces. When the Colonels staged their coup in 1943, the people were quite ready to give the new government—military dictatorship though it was—a chance to clean out the ill-smelling debris left by the oligarchy. It was not until the Axis sympathizers, with Perón as leader, clearly took charge and applied Nazi policies at home as well as in their country's foreign relations, that the democratic forces began to coalesce and prepare to fight.

But if Perón unified the democratic opposition and for the first time called into being a strong public conscience, and anger, and healthy antagonism, he also found ways to make this force inoperative. By outlawing parties, jailing leaders or driving them into exile, abolishing independent trade unions, denying his opponents access to the air, terrorizing the press, and subjecting ordinary citizens to gangster attacks, he undoubtedly weakened the organized opposition. When the campaign began, the democrats had to start from scratch. They talked about the united strength of the established parties (Perón's were improvised for the occasion); but parties which have existed under a ban for more than two years—following a period of almost fifteen years of practical inanition while the oligarchy held sway—cannot possibly be strong. They can gain strength only from a fresh and powerful appeal to wide sections of the people. And to make that appeal effective they need more than enthusiasm: they need money, time to organize, good leadership, and the opportunity to operate on equal terms with their opponents. Above all, they need a vigorous, positive popular program. Of these requirements, the Democratic Union had two—enthusiasm and a fair amount of money.

They had no time—less than two months between the day the union was formally organized and election day. They had honest leaders, but none with national reputation, and none with the necessary dynamism. Tamborini struck me as a thoroughly decent, able person and

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a sincere democrat. Unfortunately he lacks force and that quality of popular appeal that makes leaders. Mosca I saw only briefly—at the final rally of the Radical Party and at Radical headquarters on election day. He has a good presence, and many people consider him stronger than Tamborini. But a Vice-Presidential candidate cannot act as national leader in any case. Since out of political necessity the candidates had to be Radicals, it is useless to urge that better men could have been found in other parties. It is a fact, just the same, that Americo Ghioldi, Socialist leader and candidate for the Senate, struck me as a far more impressive personality, as well as a man of strength and great intelligence. The two who headed the ticket were there because they were acceptable to everyone; in a coalition this is too often the deciding factor.

Obviously the Democratic Union could not fight Perón on equal terms. It was known and freely charged that he used the funds of the Department of Labor and Welfare —his own creation—to push his candidacy. It was charged, if not proved, that he also used funds collected from the public for relief of the victims of the terrible earthquake in San Juan. (If he did not use them they have mysteriously disappeared, for no homes or public buildings have been restored and no general relief distributed.) He dominated the air, using far more time for his campaign than his opponents were able to buy. He controlled the streets. Anyone who has been in a Latin American town during an election—or, indeed, for months afterward—knows that every sidewalk, house front, wall, or park bench becomes a billboard for election slogans, slapped on with generous strokes of the brush. In Buenos Aires the pro-Perón signs outnumbered all others at least ten to one. (I saw *Muera Braden* lettered boldly on the front wall of the home of our own cultural attaché!) The disproportion was not a measure of the energy of the competing parties; what it proved was the blatant partiality of the police, who arrested democratic sign painters while they let the Peronistas display their talents without restraint.

The street signs were only a symbol of the underlying ugly fact that the police power of the state was used consistently against the democratic parties. No pro-democratic rally was protected from hoodlum attacks; armed Peronistas ruled the streets, and on more than one occasion the police themselves shot into unarmed crowds. Individuals wearing Tamborini buttons were attacked or insulted with the police standing by. And this went on until forty-eight hours before the election, when the army took over.

Perón had all the advantages of a dictator bent upon making himself President. In addition he had the church. With few exceptions—the more remarkable because they were so few—the clergy supported Perón's candidacy, some openly from the pulpit, most of them quietly among their parishioners. Many democrats with whom I talked believed the church was their most dangerous and determined adversary.

A NEGATIVE FIGHT

But above all the other disabilities suffered by the Democratic Union I put its lack of a concrete program of social and economic reform. One can understand this lack and even excuse it. It was none the less fatal.

The election was fought on a negative rather than a positive platform: it was fought to defeat dictatorship at home and a pro-Axis policy abroad; it was fought against Perón. The Blue Book only served to document charges already made over and over by the democrats. They campaigned to rid their country of the shame of Nazi domination of the army, Nazi control of major industries, Nazi control of foreign affairs. At the final huge Radical rally before the election the excited crowd chanted over and over, "Argentina, Si; Nazis, No" and "Li-ber-tad, Li-ber-tad." The speakers enlarged on the same theme.

In this clear, limited, anti-fascist campaign were enlisted the best of Argentina's conscious democratic elements. The stand they made was magnificent. Doctors, engineers, housewives who had never taken part in any public action in their lives, students organized in tight, highly disciplined formations, these and many others plunged into the political fight. The conscience of Argentina was fully aroused, and it will not, I am certain, subside into indifference as long as Perón holds power. The regular parties put all their best energies into the campaign. The young Socialists and Communists, in particular, moved into the front lines and bore the brunt of the street fighting. The women especially distinguished themselves. An American friend of mine entertained a most proper Argentine friend of hers one hot afternoon for tea. The visitor opened her white knitted purse and took out a rock which had been tucked in among her cosmetics and handkerchief. She had come direct from a street meeting where trouble had been expected.

This courage and energy were not wasted. The tragedy is that they were spent in a fight that failed to reach down and win the masses. Fascism had to be defeated, certainly, but the people to whom Perón directed his shrewd demagogy were interested in something more concrete than liberty—economic security. That the democrats were not sufficiently aware of this was indicated by the attitude of their leaders.

I talked to Tamborini two days after the election, when he was still confident of victory. His position on Nazism was clear-cut; he made a point of telling me that he had favored intervention in Europe while Lindbergh and others like him were still active in the United States. I asked him about Perón's following. He said that they were poor devils who "worshiped Perón" because they didn't understand the factors which had caused the improved conditions in Argentina: new plants opened to

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meet war demands, higher wages, increased employment. They credited all these benefits to Perón. Inflation, he added, had outstripped wage increases, but Perón wasn't blamed for that. I asked whether this fanatical devotion did not present the democrats with a serious challenge if they came to power. Would it not be essential to put through a program of basic economic reforms? He assented, in general terms, but made it clear that the Radicals had no concrete plan to offer a class which, he freely admitted, had been "disregarded by the parties." He suggested that after Perón's defeat and the disintegration of his machine, the Socialists and Communists would "take care of" his mass following. This rather vague attitude was not surprising. The Radical Party, among its many traditions, cherishes a tradition of supporting broad democratic political aims rather than detailed economic programs. It stands for constitutional government and personal liberty; it opposes fraud and political corruption; beyond that it dislikes being pinned down. Besides, as Tamborini pointed out, the party was restrained by political decency from making promises which could compete with Perón's.

The other parties in the Democratic Union were obviously inhibited by the coalition and their knowledge that if they won, the government would be in the hands of the Radicals. Their programs were more specific, much more detailed, especially those of the Socialists and Communists, but they were all aimed above the heads of the poor and unlettered who formed the bulk of Perón's devotees. Many members of the left parties, especially the younger ones, recognized this.

In any case it was self-evident that a campaign coalition which included every important anti-fascist group from right to left—from Vandenberg to Foster, in North American terms—could not adopt a program or resort to methods aimed primarily at the masses. In addition, the behavior of the dictatorship and the fact of Nazi espionage and infiltration were the obvious political issues, the issues which affected Argentina's immediate future as a nation. So the fight remained on a safely abstract level, while Perón, the shrewd officer turned dictator, promised a better life for the fellow without a shirt—a bigger share of the inexhaustible bounty of one of the richest countries on earth. When I talked to Foreign Minister Cooke after the election, he said he was sure Perón had won. I asked him why. He answered,

THE HAUNTED QUEUE

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"Perón carries a banner." Perón is a fascist and a demagogue; but the poor people of Argentina have elected him President.

WHAT OF THE FUTURE?

When The Nation Associates submitted its memorandum to the United Nations Assembly in London, requesting the suspension of Argentina, the case against Perón was clear and simple. He headed a dictatorship maintaining itself in power by police force and ruling by decree. He had violated the provisions of the Chapultepec Charter, on the basis of which his government had been admitted to the world security organization. His ties with the Nazis were common knowledge. His plans of aggression had been explicitly set forth, creating a threat to hemispheric security which hardly needed documentation. But the whole case was presently fully documented in the Blue Book issued by the State Department as a "Consultation among the American Republics with Respect to the Argentine Situation."

For reasons that were fully discussed at the time, no action was taken at London. One reason was the imminence of the Argentine elections: within a few weeks Perón might be supplanted by a democratic government; or Perón might become President under circumstances that would allow him to claim a constitutional basis for his regime. The inclination was to wait and see.

It would be unrealistic to pretend that Perón has not strengthened his international position by his victory. "Free elections" have become almost a fetish in United Nations circles; and it is comfortable to pretend—as the British and we are pretending in Greece—that an orderly vote is enough to wipe out years of fascist intimidation. Many people in Washington and London and the Latin American capitals will accept Perón's election as a welcome escape from an awkward situation.

In my first dispatch from Buenos Aires on February 24, I wrote, "The worst contingency any of [the democratic leaders] can imagine is Perón's election. Few believe this possible in view of today's peaceful balloting, but the chance is there. The result . . . would be disastrous for the anti-fascist forces in Argentina. Its international effect would be even worse. At the very least it would mean a bad defeat for the democratic inter-American policy supported by Mr. Braden." I did not then expect the "worst" to happen; now that it has, I am afraid my conclusion was not exaggerated. The democratic forces in Argentina face a very hard fight in a seriously weakened condition. And Braden's policy is going to find less and less support in Latin America and among the other nations. Only if Perón adopts a defiant attitude, at home and abroad, can the opposition quickly rally its forces for an effective counter-campaign. But Perón is too shrewd to do any such thing; already he is beginning to make overtures to members of the opposing parties.

The anti-Peronistas say they are determined to maintain the Democratic Union, build an opposition in the Congress, and challenge Perón's promise of constitutional freedom by carrying on their fight in the press and by all other legal methods. The issues on which they waged the campaign have not been wiped out by the election. The pro-Nazis are still securely intrenched in the army and in business; the process of building a military machine geared to aggression is still under way; plans have been announced for a triumphal tour by President Perón of the neighboring friendly countries to cement ties already formed. The democrats of Argentina have a job on their hands. To do it effectively they must take to heart the full implications of their defeat; they must realize that nineteenth-century liberalism will not by itself defeat twentieth-century neo-fascism.

The opposition to Perón abroad must also continue and must also gear its strategy to the new situation. I asked Mr. Cooke what effect he thought Perón's victory would have on Argentina's international position. He said it could only have a good effect. He insisted again on the unreserved indorsement of the election by the Democratic Union and the press, and said pointedly, "It is hardly likely that any nation will wish to question the freely expressed will of the Argentine people." I pointed to the charges in the Blue Book as unfinished business that might interfere with the happy relations he predicted. He brushed them aside as "based on reports by discredited Nazi agents," and indicated that they would not stand up at all under the rebuttal being prepared by the Foreign Office—a rebuttal which has not, incidentally, so far been presented.

But strategically he was probably right. It is going to be difficult to induce the other American republics or the world at large to concentrate on even the most damaging charges against a government which has just chalked up a solid electoral triumph. The State Department and all people who understand the threat to security implied in Perón's election must persuade world opinion that the test of the new government lies in its policy, not in the number of votes it received. The burden of proof still rests on Perón. The department had no choice but to reiterate its refusal to accept a security pact to which the Perón government is a signatory; it should explain that stand carefully to the American republics. The suspension of Argentina from the UNO would further underline its present status, emphasizing what cannot be ignored merely because an election has been held: that the pledges made when Perón's government came into the world organization have yet to be redeemed; and that Argentina's right to continued membership in the United Nations will depend upon the speed and sincerity with which Perón repudiates his past policy and abandons his past practices. Until then the case against him cannot be dismissed.

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Exit the Wisconsin Progressives

BY MILES McMILLIN

Editorial writer and political columnist for the Madison Capital Times; *formerly publicity director for the Progressive Party*

Madison, Wisconsin, March 20

A WISCONSIN farmer with a gift for homely and colorful expression rose to his feet. He was one of 425 delegates gathered at the little city of Portage to assist at the burial rites of the state's twelve-year-old Progressive Party. Said he solemnly: "If this is a funeral, it's a strange one, because we're having trouble getting the corpse into the grave." He was right. The corpse was kicking up a hell of a row. The farmer who summed up the situation so pointedly had sat for several hours listening to a heated debate between those who wanted to bury the Progressive Party and those who wanted to try to resuscitate it.

The Progressives finally surrendered their identity, but they did so reluctantly. They did so only after they heard from Senator Robert M. La Follette that he recommended a switch back to the Republican Party, from which the third party had sprung in 1934. In the final tally 284 delegates voted to follow Senator La Follette's advice; 77 wanted to continue the party which had once sent seven of the state's ten Representatives to Washington, elected a United States Senator and a governor, and obtained a near majority in the legislature—all in one year; 51 wanted to go into the Democratic Party.

It was not an easy decision for Progressives, long accustomed to damning Republicans, to make. But bolstering their pride with many a ringing blast at the Old Guard, they went back. There were a number of reasons for their action. For one thing, hard as it was to admit it, they recognized that the Progressive Party organization had collapsed completely in 1944, when for the first time in its history it ran an ignominious third. They recognized too that as Republicans their candidates for county and legislative offices would have a better chance of being elected in traditionally Republican Wisconsin. But most of all they wanted to do whatever was necessary to assure Bob La Follette's reelection to the Senate.

Their feeling is shared by thousands of progressive-minded people here, both in and out of the Progressive Party. One is William T. Evjue, whose militant Madison *Capital Times* is a power in Wisconsin politics. Evjue helped found the party in 1934 but split with the La Follettes when they cooled off on Roosevelt. He did not participate in the Portage meeting, and for many weeks observers have been speculating on what stand he would take on Bob La Follette. In the 1944 Senatorial contest he backed a liberal Democrat, Howard McMurray, against an old-line Progressive, Harry Sauthoff. On the day after the Portage obsequies Evjue charged in a front-page editorial that Phil and Bob La Follette had killed the Progressive Party by using it to advance their own political fortunes and by breaking with Roosevelt, but at the same time he announced that his paper would "vigorously support" La Follette's candidacy. "We do this, however," he said, "with the feeling that there must be something higher and bigger, no matter how big the individual may be, on which to build the future of a militant people's movement than the personal interests of one man."

Evjue carries great weight with the so-called Roosevelt and Wallace Progressives, whose support La Follette will need. They have been bitter about the La Follette stewardship, and their rancor has been increased by the Portage decision. They wanted the Progressives to throw in their lot with the state Democratic organization and try to clean it up. Many of the young Progressives who are now returning to civilian life have been drawn into the Democratic Party by the hope of uniting liberals behind Wallace. They would like to support La Follette, but in the disappointment caused by Portage they vow they will work for a Democratic candidate.

Evjue made no recommendations to the Progressive conference beforehand. Doubtless he would have urged them to go Democratic had he not been watching with extreme suspicion what is going on in Washington under the Truman Administration. He doesn't like the Hannegan maneuvers, and his editorial temperature has been raised by some of the President's recent appointments.

The big question is how the Progressives will fare back in the Republican fold. They will hardly be welcomed by the men who tend the flocks there—and the Old Guard was never better organized or better heeled. It is run by a voluntary committee headed by a Madison industrialist, Thomas E. Coleman, who makes no bones about his hatred for La Follette. In the last session of the legislature he tried to put through a bill which would have kept La Follette out of the Republican Party, but the bill was vetoed by eighty-three-year-old Governor Walter S. Goodland, who has consistently fought reactionary elements in his own Republican Party and has just as consistently urged that the Progressives return to the house of their fathers. Coleman has as yet brought forth no formidable candidate to contest the primary with La Follette. Circuit Judge Joseph McCarthy of Appleton, a young, able, and extremely ambitious politician, is in the field. He is comparatively unknown, but he may

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get the organization nod if nothing better comes along between now and the G. O. P. convention in May.

Progressives have a strong aid in Governor Goodland, who recently upset Coleman's plans by tossing his hat into the ring. Significantly, he did this just two days before the Progressive conference and at the same time issued a statement that he would welcome Progressives back into the G. O. P. On that day, too, he uttered a sizzling blast at the Republican-controlled legislature, whose record Coleman has always defended. Observers saw in it a bid for an alliance with Progressives against the Republican machine. Progressives curtsied politely in return two days later when they convened at Portage but left it at that. They may come out for Goodland and send him and La Follette to the barrier in the fall campaign. Progressives could support Goodland without compunction, for he has stood by them—and they by him—on some of the most controversial issues to come before the legislature. The combination of Goodland and La Follette would cause the Old Guard a herd of nightmares. Goodland, despite his advanced age, is, they concede, unbeatable. This is not because he is a crusader or reformer—indeed, he makes a point of denying that he is one—but because the voters are profoundly convinced of his sincerity and honesty.

The greatest threat to La Follette's success lies in the inroads of the Democratic Party on the labor vote. In 1940 La Follette trailed his Republican opponent in the rural areas of the state and was saved from defeat by a tremendous outpouring of labor votes in Milwaukee County. But the picture has changed. Labor votes were in the Democratic column in 1944, and the Progressive ticket was swamped. In the heavily industrial area along the Lake Michigan shore much of labor is still Democratic-minded. Kenosha and Racine, which are largely dominated by the United Automobile Workers of the C. I. O., sent delegates to the Portage conference which vigorously fought for Democratic affiliation. After the conference had voted to go Republican, they announced that they would enter their candidates in the Democratic primaries. In Wisconsin you are not allowed to split your primary ballot; you must vote a straight ticket. Therefore much of the labor support which La Follette would get in the general election, when split ballots are permitted, will be lost to him in the primaries. If he faces a close race out in the state, the loss of the labor vote in large cities may throw the primary to an Old Guard Republican.

Progressives hope that La Follette's labor record will induce outside leadership in the U. A. W. and other C. I. O. unions to come in and try to arrange some help for him. It is known that the Reuthers feel warmly toward him, and it is hoped that their attitude may soften the determination of some of the labor factions to stick to the Democratic ticket.

Meanwhile, Phil La Follette is maintaining a strict hands-off policy in Wisconsin politics. He has said nothing publicly about the situation of the Progressives and did not attend the Portage meeting.

The FCC Listens In

BY JERRY SPINGARN

An expert on radio law; formerly employed by the FCC

THE Federal Communications Commission has taken notice of the plight of the radio listener and issued a mercilessly critical report on programming, severely entitled "Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees."* And it has showed its teeth by calling for the program logs of about three hundred stations. Industry reflexes have been immediate and violent. Justin Miller, president of the National Association of Broadcasters, in a statement published far more widely than the story of the report, called the action "a reversion to that type of government control and regulation which our forefathers struggled to escape." One trade magazine opened its news story with, "The federal government is going into the radio-program business." Within a week the N. A. B. announced the results of a public-opinion poll which showed that 82 per cent of the people of the United States think radio is doing either an "excellent" or a "good" job in the community.

* Copies obtainable free on request to the FCC.

Actually the report is a highly circumspect document, and its issuance should have caused no surprise since former Chairman Paul A. Porter had announced its preparation a year ago in a speech to the N. A. B.

"Public service" has been a prerequisite for station licenses since crystal-set days, but until the issuance of this report no one had tried to define the phrase. Attempts to criticize or discipline stations for inadequate programming were invariably characterized as "censorship," and censorship power is specifically denied the FCC by law. As a result, thinking has been hazy and license renewals have been virtually automatic. The FCC's functions, in the opinion of the radio bar, are those of a technological traffic cop—namely, to see that each station stays within its assigned frequency, power, and time limits. Indeed, at one time the FCC glibly answered letters of complaint with the words, "The FCC has no concern with program content."

The new report on program service, using such objec-

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tive yardsticks as the stop watch and the ledger, proves that the line between service appraisal and censorship is a clear one, and that it is possible for the FCC to insist on a better break for listeners without imposing its taste and political opinions on the public or reducing the latitude of licensees. Moreover, it marshals precedents to show that Congress expected the agency to protect the public's interest in good programs. The report asserts that in the future, "in issuing and renewing the licenses of broadcast stations, the commission proposes to give particular consideration to four service factors relevant to public interest. These are (1) the carrying of sustaining programs, (2) the carrying of local live programs, (3) the carrying of programs devoted to the discussion of public issues, and (4) the elimination of advertising excesses."

Most of the 139-page pamphlet is devoted to a description of the sins of broadcasting, and it is fascinating, if occasionally gruesome, reading. An array of charts and graphs shows that broadcasters have tended to drop sustaining programs whenever they could get a remunerative replacement, and that the networks have failed "to provide nation-wide distribution for even outstanding network programs." To name but a few: "Invitation to Learning" was carried by only 39 CBS affiliates and rejected by 97. "Transatlantic Call: People to People" was carried by 86 CBS stations and rejected by 50. "Labor for Victory" (produced alternately by the C. I. O. and the A. F. of L.) was carried by 35 NBC stations and rejected by 104. Most of these rejections were in favor of local shows which consisted of record-playing mixed with spot commercials.

The FCC sees an urgent need for more sustaining programs. These would restore the over-all program balance and provide time for (1) programs not appropriate for sponsorship, such as religious and discussion programs, (2) programs serving the more cultivated minority tastes and interests, like symphonic music, (3) programs of non-profit organizations—educational, civic, religious, agricultural, labor, (4) experimental programs which will tend to fertilize the art. The report shows unbroken hours of soap operas on afternoon network schedules. These programs appeal to a very small proportion of the afternoon audience—about 75 per cent of the persons at home during the afternoon keep their radios off. The profit motive seems inadequate to encourage programs of wider appeal, however, for "an advertiser may prefer a soap opera which appeals to only one million listeners and indelibly impresses the name of his product on two-thirds of them, rather than a non-soap-opera program which appeals to two million listeners but impresses his name on less than one-third."

The report points out that N. A. B. standards regarding commercial announcements, though widely publicized, are honored in the breach, and that even on the networks the listener must endure five separate "plugs," "hitch-hikers," and "cow-catchers" between shows. It plaintively suggests, "The listener who has heard one or more commercial announcements may reasonably expect a program to intervene."

The paucity of local live programs indicates that stations are not adequately serving their home communities. During the good listening hours, 6 to 11 p.m., the report shows, less than 12 per cent of the air time of forty-one of the most powerful (50 KW) stations was devoted to station-originated, commercial live shows. "This sterility is reflected in the size of station staffs. The average station employed less than one-third of a musician [what's this we've been reading about Petrillo?] and less than one-half of a full-time actor. For every dollar paid to the average writer $2.39 was paid to the average salesman."

The FCC warns that "the public interest clearly requires that an adequate amount of time be set aside for the discussion of public issues, and the commission, in determining whether a station has served the public interest, will take into consideration the amount of time which has been [so] devoted." It leaves to the station manager's decision the important policy questions affecting public-discussion programs, such as whether discussion of controversial issues should be on free or paid time, whether it is fair to continue to charge higher rates for political broadcasts, how and by whom commentators should be selected, whether commentators should be forbidden, permitted, or encouraged to express their own personal opinions, and whether a "right to reply" should exist on the air. The FCC requires only that the station show honesty and good faith in presenting both sides.

The FCC urges the formation of radio-listener councils through which listeners can convey to broadcasters the wishes of the vast but inarticulate radio audience. It sets forth new procedures which the FCC will employ to enforce higher program standards. The effectiveness of these standards will depend in large measure upon the extent to which listeners participate in the administrative process by attendance at hearings.

With characteristic restraint the report states that "there are no economic considerations to prevent the rendering of considerably broader program service than the public is now afforded." In 1944, it goes on, the industry's average rate of return on depreciated value of its investment was 222.6 per cent. There has been a progressive increase in rate of profit from year to year. "This increase," the report concludes, "was not due solely to increased advertising revenues but is also attributable in considerable part to the fact that the industry has progressively retained a larger part of each revenue dollar as profit and spent a smaller proportion for serving the public."

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France After De Gaulle

BY J. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO

Paris, March 20

ANY evaluation of France today runs the risk of being superficial and contradictory or telling only half-truths unless it takes account of the last six years. In 1940 the people of France awoke to find that a hurricane had swept away their nation, leaving a desolate land where men lived with no other ambition than to continue living. Corruption had reached incredible proportions. Flouting the Versailles treaty, French industry had allied itself, against the national interest, with the great industries of the Ruhr. Venality was an accepted synonym for the press. Scarcely a national institution remained that was not rotten to the core. Perhaps just one—the army—whose glory still appeared intact in the eyes of the average Frenchman. Then came the "six weeks' war"; the army collapsed under the Nazi blitz, and with it the last remnant of French confidence was destroyed. From that moment France declined rapidly. The man who completed its humiliation, who handed this proud nation over to the Germans and inaugurated the ignoble Vichy era, was no discredited politician but the most revered marshal of France. "Monsieur Verdun" exchanged the role of national hero for that of doorman for the invaders. Now there was nothing left for Frenchmen to believe in.

Yet here and there a few inspired fools, refusing to believe their country was lost, left by night for a place where Frenchmen could look each other in the face without shame. The greatest of them all escaped to London; as Pétain gave his blessing to the capitulation the voice of De Gaulle could be heard proclaiming that France had not died. And inside France other dreamers began to stir in the ruins; from the lips of one of its leaders I heard the fascinating story of the movement that was later to be known as *la Résistance*. They had no foundation on which to build. The political parties had disappeared. The Socialists had paid dearly for tolerating within their ranks appeasers like Paul Faure and cowards like Georges Monnet. The bourgeois parties had ceased to exist along with the state on which they had always lived as parasites. The only party which might have carried on the struggle against the capitulators, the Communist Party, was immobilized by the Russo-German pact. A deputy of the time has described to me the spirit of defeat that pervaded the Chamber of Deputies the day it voted for the dissolution of the Republic. Not a single heroic note. A few deputies voted "no," but theirs was only a passive resistance, not *la Résistance*.

Among the patriots waging their battle against the Germans and Vichy there was not a single leader with any real political experience. In London De Gaulle was hoping someone would come forward, an Herriot or a Mandel, whose name would lend authority to his movement. He was surrounded by a few intellectuals, journalists, army officers who had survived Dunkirk or the Battle of Norway. They were a curious mixture: some believed only in force, others only in De Gaulle, the rest only in themselves. Some were servile and fawning, others inflexible and hypercritical. But none of them were capable of building a unified political movement.

Resistance is a spontaneous phenomenon, slow to become articulated. It is life in a tunnel. Within France the underground began little by little to find its leaders. Months elapsed before contact with London was established. But how could the French in London give the resistance a political leadership which they themselves lacked? The directives which came from De Gaulle's headquarters were largely of a military nature—how to organize sabotage, how to receive and distribute the arms which English planes would drop by parachute. The Resistance created a milieu of healthy, refreshing youth—but without political direction. That was its chief weakness. Once liberation had been won, the hour of the Resistance was over. If in the first elections it still had a role to play, today observers are agreed that it will carry no weight in the June elections; that is a loss for France.

Nation readers will recall with what close attention we followed anything that seemed to indicate a political organization in the Resistance. The discussions which took place among men hunted by the Gestapo, were no product of our imagination. But they were restricted to a small group of intellectuals and former militants of the youth organizations. This generation of men and women in their early thirties ought now to be taking the place of the old politicians. But precisely because they were the generation of front-line fighters, the best of the Resistance, they suffered the heaviest casualties; four-fifths of the most daring, the most qualified for leadership, were lost in the fifty months of struggle. Some of the survivors form the new team in the present government. Others have found it difficult to adapt themselves to the discipline of political parties; highly intelligent, extremely critical, they remain isolated fighters no longer quite sure what they want. For them the Socialist Party lacks aggressiveness and attraction. They feel the Communist Party echoes too faithfully the language of Moscow; yet it is to the Communists more than to any other group that they are turning in their search for a new path.

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For a long period under the occupation France knew no political life. It was not until after the American landings in North Africa that the old parties began to revive, and even then the Resistance had to go looking for them. The C. G. T., the C. I. O. of France, moved very cautiously; the Radical Socialists were still more wary. Only the Communists quickly regained their former activity; once the handicap of the Russo-German pact had been removed, they threw themselves into the struggle with characteristic vigor and before the Resistance was aware of it had distributed their men throughout the movement. With the liberation, the Communist Party emerged as the strongest organization in France.

The Resistance might have set up around De Gaulle outside of France a group of leaders which later could have broken away from his influence and put its stamp on French post-war politics. Anxious to keep its best men in the underground, however, it sent to the Consultative Assembly in Algiers those whom it considered to be the least useful at home. The French National Committee, later to become the government in exile, included only a token force of Resistance men, none of whom possessed the strong personality of De Gaulle. Until after the liberation, indeed until after the last elections, when the new Parliament was formed and the parties began to match their strength against De Gaulle's, the Liberator stood unchallenged. By 1943 the country had become Gaullist. But Gaullism meant different things to different Frenchmen. In this atmosphere of confusion the Resistance was not able to hammer out a clear political line of its own.

Thus at the moment of liberation two forces confronted each other in France—De Gaulle and the Communists. This is the key to the events which followed and to the political situation today. Within a few months the Socialists had recovered some of their old strength. A new party entered the picture, the *Mouvement Républicain Populaire* (M. R. P.), but though its members were drawn from many different strata, its policy focused on a single man, De Gaulle. Now the General does not want to be leader of any party or faction; he wants to be leader of France. On the other hand, the M. R. P., though it carries the hopes of the Vatican, includes people who have no wish to become the right-wing party of France—and today De Gaulle is definitely considered to be a man of the right.

Speculation as to whether the General will or will not return to French politics is at most an amusing game; but if it seems safe to predict that De Gaulle will never be a party man, it is even safer to say that he will never back a violent revolt. He wants to be the man of June 18. He lives for history. Though somewhat clouded, his prestige is still great, and he has decided henceforth to guard it himself. Today De Gaulle speaks only to De Gaulle. He is a meditator. That is his weakness and his strength. During the uneasy days of the last government crisis he alone felt perfectly at ease. He sat aloof and solitary, appearing almost not to hear the passionate debate that raged around him.

France faces the immense task of reconstruction with a political machine handicapped in parties and men. Capable organizers are desperately needed. The Socialists still have Léon Blum, but though he is unquestionably their greatest leader, he is becoming more and more the godfather of the party, unwilling to serve as Prime Minister, or as Minister, or even as a Deputy. The other Socialist chiefs—Vincent Auriol, Félix Gouin, André Philip, Jules Moch, Salomon Grumbach, Marius Moutet—come from the Old Guard. The only new figure is General Secretary Daniel Mayer, a young man who distinguished himself in the Resistance, a hard worker and a good organizer but not yet an outstanding leader. New blood has been injected into the ranks by militant youngsters who got their schooling in the underground; they will surely be a constructive force in promoting working-class unity instead of hate, distrust, and division. But they are still too young and too much a part of the rank and file to exercise an immediate influence on the party.



Georges Bidault

The M. R. P. has two men—Maurice Schumann, the general secretary, who proved an effective propagandist on Radio London during the occupation, and Georges Bidault, whose position as Minister of Foreign Affairs is becoming more and more solid. But neither is a leader of great stature. The Communist Party counts Maurice Thorez, intelligent and energetic; the eloquent Jacques Duclos; François Billoux, an able minister; and such talented organizers as Madeleine Braun and Marie Claude Vaillant-Couturier. On the other hand, it has lost some of its best men—Gabriel Péri and hundreds of young underground fighters who might have been the leaders of tomorrow. Among the new figures in the party is Pierre Hervé, a brilliant young columnist who writes regularly for *l'Humanité*. With old chieftains discredited by their parties' pre-war politics, and others fallen in the Battle of France, it is natural that the party with the best machinery and organization should make the most rapid advance. In Paris one frequently hears it

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said that the Communists have passed their peak and in the next elections will lose rather than gain strength. That is not my impression. Others predict that the Radical Socialists will make a come-back. But the man-power shortage is even more acute in the Radical Socialist Party than in the others; while Herriot continues to lag a half-century behind, aggressive Pierre Cot finds himself in constant disagreement with his party. The Radical Socialist member of the Commission on the Constitution has just resigned because he could not accept Herriot's conservative position on colonial policy.

The intermediate parties, the parties of the bourgeoisie, have suffered the most by virtue of the disappearance of the middle class as an important political force, a phenomenon by no means restricted to France. So it is around the working class, organized in the Socialist and Communist parties and the C. G. T., that the political future of France is being decided.

The tendency to forget this whole panorama makes it difficult for foreign observers, accustomed to thinking in terms of Anglo-Saxon democracy or easygoing pre-war France, to understand the superhuman effort toward recovery of a country which only six years ago seemed to have collapsed forever.

Houses from the Assembly Line

BY ROBERT LASCH

An editorial writer for the Chicago Sun, *Mr. Lasch wrote the* Atlantic Monthly *prize essay on Freedom of the Press in 1944. He has a book coming out in April called "Breaking the Building Blockade."*

THE most exciting part of Expediter Wilson Wyatt's national housing program is his proposal to establish within two years a new American industry comparable to the automobile industry of the twenties. Since Mr. Wyatt announced his intentions early in February, sweeping the timid plans of private industry into the discard and calling for the building of 2,700,000 homes in 1946 and 1947, the termites of special interest have been gnawing at his plan. The real-estate lobby has persuaded the House to knock out ceilings on existing houses; the big materials producers have obtained the elimination of the subsidies; the lumber industry has raised the familiar plaint against price control. But nothing disturbs the conventional home-building interests more than Mr. Wyatt's plans for prefabrication. He has shocked all standpatters with the bold suggestion that 250,000 houses be built this year in factories, and that the number be raised to 600,000 in 1947.

In no year between 1929 and 1941 were 600,000 houses built by conventional methods. What Mr. Wyatt proposes, therefore, is the creation of a new industry that will surpass the record of the old house-building industry in all but its palmiest days. He proposes, not that the new industry displace the old, but that the two work side by side to give us sustained production on a level that we have never been able to reach before.

Two distinct developments in house building have been accelerated by the war. The first is a change in conventional building methods brought about by the construction of whole blocks or neighborhoods at one time. "Site fabrication" in its more dramatic manifestations adapts the technique of the war-time shipyard to the building of houses. What amounts to an outdoor factory is set up on the site of a large community development. With a carefully organized flow of materials geared into mechanized labor operations, fifty or a thousand houses go up together. Henry Kaiser, using this method, built a community for 35,000 people in ninety days.

Prefabrication introduces a new process altogether—factory production of structural panels or sections which, together with other prefabricated parts, are shipped to the site for assembly by relatively unskilled labor. "Prefab" built about one-fifth of all government war housing. Mr. Wyatt wants to assign it the same proportion of his 1946 objectives and then to raise its 1947 contribution to 40 per cent. If he succeeds, he will bring into being within two years an industry with an output of some $3.5 billion worth of housing a year.

Prefab versus site fabrication is a controversy of long standing. But there is no need to choose between them; each has its role to perform. The site fabricators find their natural outlet in the rapid erection of large communities, usually on the outskirts of growing cities. The prefabricators may expect to supply individual houses for erection in smaller towns and rural areas.

Probably not more than 10,000 prefabricated houses in the true sense were built during the thirties, when the industry first began gropingly to produce. War needs, for barracks and war workers' homes, gave prefabrication its first great opportunity. The dozen or so firms regularly producing in 1940 had increased to eighty by 1942. Up to last July 116,000 prefabricated houses had been built for the federal Public Housing Authority. Manufacturers have assured Mr. Wyatt that the industry has a capacity today of 200,000 a year and with the aid of newcomers can meet the 250,000 goal.

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The kind of house one can get from this infant industry varies widely with the firm, the method, and the materials. Buckminster Fuller, whose "Dymaxion" house, hung from a central mast, is familiar as a Sunday-supplement vision of the future, is getting ready to produce a real-life Dymaxion in the Beech Aircraft Company plant at Wichita, Kansas. This house makes use of techniques developed in producing bombers. It is round like an igloo, is built of aluminum, glass, and plastics, and can be shipped in one piece, eight to a freight car.

Far less radical are the products of most prefabricators. While some embody modern design, with flat roofs and large window areas, many follow traditional models, including the inevitable Cape Cod. George Fred Keck's solar house, the application of ideas descended from Frank Lloyd Wright, is scheduled for prefabrication by Green's Houses, of Rockford, Illinois, and the Willisway System on the West Coast is producing the unfortunately named "Homeola," a straightforward love-in-a-cottage type. Some manufacturers build the house in sections, a wall at a time, and deliver the pieces by truck. Others use the principle of modular panels, often made of glued plywood on a hollow frame, which are bolted or wedged together on the site.

Nearly everybody, I suppose, has seen an unfortunate sample of prefabrication, decided that it looked like a chicken-house, and resolved to have none of it. But prefabrication has to its credit thousands of attractive and well-built homes. In justice it must be remembered that prefab inherited the least desirable end of the war-housing job. Conventional builders and site fabricators supplied most of the permanent homes; prefabricators built the demountable and temporary houses, stripped down to the lowest essentials.

Factory construction of houses infringes on vested interests in many fields. The A. F. of L. craft unions which dominate custom home building have rioted against prefabrication in some towns and in others have rigged the building code or tightened their union rules to exclude it. Mr. Wyatt must find some way to overcome their opposition if his program is to succeed. The Dymaxion project has an officer of the machinists' union (A. F. of L.) on its board of directors, and the C. I. O. has organized many prefab plants. But both the machinists and the C. I. O. are outside the industry, wanting to get in; the carpenters, bricklayers, and other crafts are determined to keep them out. It will also be necessary to circumvent the hostility of contractors, materials dealers, and equipment suppliers, who see in the new method of building houses fast a challenge to their stake in the old ways of building them slowly.

Mr. Wyatt's program allots to prefab the special task of building those low-cost homes which custom building has been unable to supply. It is true that to date the prefabricators have not attained astonishing cost differentials as compared with traditional construction. But that has been due to the narrowness of the housing market in a low-income economy and the lack of a distribution system permitting mass sales and economical assembly. Mr. Wyatt proposes to broaden the market during the emergency period by offering to buy every prefab house built to government standards which the manufacturers cannot dispose of through ordinary channels.

In order to qualify for government-purchase contracts manufacturers will have to prove their ability to build a satisfactory product, show a distribution scheme assuring prompt erection, and guarantee to produce a specified number within twelve months. A one-bedroom house would be designed to sell for $3,500, with each extra bedroom costing $500 more. This price includes equipment but not land, freight, or assembly costs. With such items added, the typical two-bedroom prefab may be expected to sell for something between $5,000 and $6,000.

By the time government guaranties are withdrawn, it is hoped that the industry will be able to stand on its own feet. Much will depend upon the maintenance of quality standards. Some persons connected with the industry fear that high costs may compel one compromise after another, with the result that thousands of substandard structures will be scattered over the country to the permanent detriment of prefabrication's good repute. Mr. Wyatt, however, makes it plain that he wants "permanent homes which will meet accepted standards." He can get them, at the cost levels he has fixed and with the quality he demands, only by successfully organizing the flow of price-controlled materials into volume production by competent manufacturers.

To carry out his program Mr. Wyatt urgently needs the intelligent aid of town and city housing authorities. The community should control or itself undertake the acquisition of land and insist upon the application of sound planning principles; the new neighborhoods must be planned as community assets of permanent value, not shanty towns that will be future liabilities.

The goal of 2,700,000 houses in two years cannot be reached if part of Mr. Wyatt's proposals are accepted and the rest rejected. Unless he can control the prices of materials, land, and existing houses, mounting costs will cut thousands of home-hunting families out of the market. Unless labor is quickly recruited and trained, an industry that has been operating at partial capacity for fifteen years will be unable to meet the huge demands now placed upon it. Unless priorities, subsidies, and government sharing of risks greatly expand production, the present acute shortage will continue indefinitely.

On the other hand, if Mr. Wyatt can turn the trick, his veterans' housing program may well prepare the way for the greater task of the future—the building of 1,500,000 homes a year until every city has wiped out its slums and urban life has entered a new age.

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EVERYBODY'S BUSINESS

Politics at Savannah

IN HIS message of welcome to the delegates who assembled at Savannah on March 9 to inaugurate the World Fund and Bank, President Truman said: 'The great institutions provided for at Bretton Woods must now become living, operating organisms. To breathe life into these institutions is your challenging task."

His injunction was obeyed with more vigor than discretion by Secretary of the Treasury Vinson, who, taking charge of the newly delivered international twins, spanked and shook them in a way that left some of the other attendant midwives aghast. Fortunately, they survived this rough treatment and are now headed for Washington cradles, each with a corps of twelve executive directors assisted by twelve alternates to nurse them. Whether they will be smothered, as the British seem to fear, by too much attention remains to be seen. Certainly, their lives hang on a thread until Congress makes up its mind about the British loan, for if denied assistance in restoring its balance of payments, it is questionable whether Britain could fulfil its obligations under the Bretton Woods agreements.

The auspices for a favorable decision on this matter are now encouraging. A more permanent danger is one against which Lord Keynes warned in his opening address at Savannah. Recalling the tale of the Sleeping Beauty, he expressed the hope that the christening of "Master Fund" and "Miss Bank" would not be marred by the uninvited appearance of a malicious sprite to pronounce a curse, which, he suggested, might run as follows: "You two brats shall grow up politicians; your every thought and act shall have an *arrière-pensée;* everything you determine shall not be for its own sake or on its own merits but because of something else."

It would be naive, in the present state of the world, to expect that politics can be kept out of the Bank and Fund entirely. The directors, though the paid servants of the institutions, are also the nominees and representatives of their respective governments, which will look to them to uphold national interests. They will be unlikely to pass on an application for assistance by their own country with complete objectivity. Moreover, the opportunities for log-rolling deals are obvious, and there will undoubtedly be occasions when projects are supported or opposed in board meetings not on their economic merits but for purely political reasons. If the present tendency for the world to be split up into blocs is not arrested, it will be difficult to prevent the weighing of every loan proposal in the balance of power.

The chief responsibility for curbing political exploitation of the Fund and Bank rests on the United States. As the biggest contributor to both, it wields the largest number of votes and can probably control or influence enough others to give it a majority on most occasions. It will not be a borrower from the Bank; on the contrary it is largely from American sources that the Bank's loans will be financed. Nor is it likely in the foreseeable future to need the assistance of the Fund to meet a shortage of foreign exchange. But this country has a great interest in seeing that the avowed purpose of these institutions—the peaceful expansion of world trade—is achieved, for only then will American farms and factories have a chance of finding the wider markets they will soon be seeking. That is to say, American support of Fund and Bank is dictated by self-interest but, from the nature of the case, by a broader self-interest than that of some other nations.

The United States, therefore, has both the means and the incentive to prevent the perversion of these international financial institutions. But it must itself refrain from looking upon them as instruments for asserting political or economic domination. If American directors are subjected to pressures from Congress to block projects that might adversely affect some particular American private interest, or from the State Department to use their influence in aiding some diplomatic maneuver, then the moral authority of American leadership in the Fund and Bank can easily be sacrificed.

From this point of view, American tactics at the Savannah conference left something to be desired. Mr. Vinson went there determined to get his own draft of by-laws for the twin institutions indorsed. His success seems to have been achieved by fast, rather than elegant, political footwork, involving bullying, bargaining, and the organization of caucuses. As I mentioned in my brief dispatch in the last issue, this led to two major disputes, in which the British delegation led the opposition. In the case of the site for Fund and Bank, objection was made to the American choice of Washington because of "its peculiar political atmosphere," as one foreign delegate put it. Ironically, Socialist Britain preferred New York, focal point of American capitalism, to what might be called the nation's collectivist center.

But it was Socialist Britain which protested in vain against the proposed salary scale for executive directors and their alternates—$17,000 and $11,500 tax free, respectively, on a full-time basis. As Lord Keynes pointed out, this level of remuneration exceeds the highest salaries available in most countries for public service, and the aggregate amount involved imposes a heavy load on the budgets of the Fund and Bank. Moreover, the British argued that a full-time board cloistered in Washington would be less valuable than one composed of men who were in more regular touch with developments in their own countries.

The final version of the by-laws included the American salary schedule but made part-time employment of directors optional. However, it was admitted that if most countries decided to appoint on a full-time basis, the others would probably have to follow suit. Whether the problems these men will have to tackle will keep them as busy as the American delegates believe or whether their positions will prove to be comfortable semi-sinecures only time can show. I myself found the American arguments on both this matter and the site question, as expounded in private conversations, quite impressive. And I am sure they were urged on the conference in good faith. But however good the American ends, the means by which they were achieved set an unfortunate precedent.

KEITH HUTCHISON

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BOOKS *and the* ARTS

WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY?

BY SIDNEY HOOK

THE report of the Commission on the Function of Philosophy in Liberal Education set up by the Board of Officers of the American Philosophical Association is now before the public. It presents a well-written and cogent defense of the place of philosophy in the curriculum of the liberal-arts college. Breathes there an administrator with soul so dead as to question the educational value of the study of philosophy—here is the intellectual stimulant that will quicken him to life. The study of philosophy is educationally important for many reasons. The culture of the Western world is a sealed book without some knowledge of its philosophic traditions. There is nothing like the study of philosophy to supply basic ideas for the integration of knowledge and perspective from which to order ideas. No other discipline can impart—to the extent that it can be imparted—the intellectual sophistication which can safeguard us from the fetishes, myths, and limitless credulities of our age.

None the less, this report reveals—what has been no secret to those with even cursory knowledge of contemporary philosophical writing—that philosophers themselves are in profound disagreement over two basic issues: the nature of philosophical subject matter and the nature of philosophical method. Apparently the only indisputably perennial question of philosophy is: What is philosophy? This situation is unparalleled in any other discipline which presumes to give knowledge. It seems to make agreement among philosophers in principle impossible. And a certain flavor of piquancy is added when it is recalled that, with the possible exception of theology, more claims to certainty have been made in philosophy than in any other field.

An answer in terms of history is suggestive but not decisive, for many propositions in mathematics, physics, and psychology have originally been advanced in the name of philosophy. As other disciplines have developed, they have broken free from philosophy. Just as soon as a speculative philosophical notion about the nature of things is given determinate form—like the ideas of conservation of energy, evolution, the unconscious, relativity—it is embodied in another subject. Philosophers have been men of varied interests. Which interest is the philosophical interest? Has philosophy a *distinctive subject matter* of its own that can be marked off from the special subject matters of the arts and sciences? Is there anything that the philosopher *as philosopher* concerns himself with, whether he be layman or professional?

I believe there is. I believe that despite their differences philosophers are actually in agreement on what constitutes this distinctive subject matter; that, unfortunately, by confusing all sorts of other issues with the question of subject matter they have obscured this agreement from themselves and have therefore failed to recognize where their basic disagreements truly lie. In consequence, philosophers are continually charging one another with misunderstanding. To misunderstand is worse than to disagree. This is not intended, of course, as a blanket indictment of all philosophers or a defense of any one philosophical school of thought. The Thomists, for example, and *some* absolute idealists as well as experimental naturalists are relatively clear about their disagreements. The chief weakness in the commission's report is not that its members disagree but that they are not clear about where they disagree.

The actual subject matter of philosophy is implicit in the demand, as documented in the commission's report, which reflective laymen have made of philosophers. They have asked the philosophers to provide a rational faith or way of life by which men may intelligently live. In so doing, they have implied that philosophy is concerned primarily with *values* as reliable guides to life. They have asked the philosophers to shed light on the basic institutional and doctrinal conflicts of our time, to relate their analysis at some point to the problems that arise when men seek to develop reliable ways of behavior and belief. They have turned to philosophers, not to the physical scientists or psychologists, for *wisdom*. And in its broadest significance *wisdom is knowledge of the origin, interrelations, career, and reliability of values in human experience*. Whatever else philosophy has been from Socrates to John Dewey, it has been a quest for wisdom. Here, and here alone, is neutral ground which can serve as a starting-point for all philosophical departures, provided it is not demanded that one particular answer to this quest be identified with the subject matter of philosophy.

Philosophical questions—but not the answers—are simple. They touch the interests of all reflective persons. They arise whenever we ask questions like the following: What is the best society for our time? What ends or values can best enrich human experience? What shall we educate for, and why? What are the most reliable methods of stabilizing belief, of solving problems? What shall we make of man, and in what directions shall we move to do it? Some philosophers—like Plato—believe that in order to answer these questions it is necessary to take note of heaven. Perhaps—perhaps not. That is not the point here. The point is that all significant philosophy from Plato to pragmatism starts from questions of this *kind*. These constitute its indis-

* "Philosophy in American Education. Its Tasks and Opportunities." By Brand Blanshard, Curt J. Ducasse, Charles V. Hendel, Arthur E. Murphy, and Max C. Otto. Harper and Brothers. $3 .

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putable subject matter. All are questions concerning the validity of basic judgments of value in different fields of human experience.

It is instructive to observe that every member of the commission at some point uses the term "wisdom" as defining the subject matter of philosophy. But then a strange thing happens—in the central chapters of the report. It is insinuated that over and above this subject matter philosophy has another, and that most criticism of the activity of philosophers is unjustified because it fails to recognize this *additional* subject matter.

Thus Arthur Murphy summarizes in an eloquent and accurate way the current criticisms of philosophical activity which assert that the business of philosophy is "to clarify, enlighten, and enrich" our value beliefs by "confronting them with the clearest thinking and widest knowledge humanly available on the matters with which they are concerned." He then asks: Is this the business of philosophy?

Mr. Murphy denies it on two grounds. The first is that such a demand requires that the philosopher become an advocate or apologist, that he forgo the distinctive task of inquiry which constitutes philosophical activity. "We want a philosophy, then, that will broaden, enlighten, and justify our faith. But which faith?" The answer is easy. We draw it from the very words in which Mr. Murphy has summarized the indictment. Which faith? Why, a faith or a set of values that "reflective criticism has shown to be best and most rewarding for actual living." And this reflective criticism involves, to repeat, "confronting them with the clearest thinking and widest knowledge humanly available on the matters with which they are concerned." By what logic Mr. Murphy assumes that such a request is a demand that the philosopher function as an apologist or propagandist is hard to see. That he does interpret it in this way is obvious from his retort that the philosopher must consider himself not an advocate but the judge or critic of the faiths of men. Excellent! But this is precisely what he has been asked to do in the original criticism.

The reason Mr. Murphy does not recognize this is apparent in the second ground he offers for rejecting the indictment. Philosophers, he writes, claim the authority to act as judge and critic of the faith of men, "not as individuals or oracles or prophets, but for their *subject*, and for their conclusions only so far as they can be tested and measured by the best that rational inquiry in this *subject* has so far achieved." What subject is Mr. Murphy talking about when he uses the word I have italicized? He started out by recognizing that philosophy is concerned with problems of value and validation. Suddenly we are confronted with another subject. This subject is not an activity or method, for Mr. Murphy himself has just distinguished between the philosophical methods of rational inquiry and the subject into which they inquire. I have scanned Mr. Murphy's pages very carefully to discover what this subject of philosophy is which gives the philosopher authority to judge between the faiths of men. Can it be Ultimate Reality? This is the classic view. The philosopher can judge what is good because he, and he alone, has insight into the Ultimately Real as distinct from the merely apparent with which the scientist concerns himself. Against such a conception of philosophy, if only it were frankly professed, many formidable technical criticisms can be made. Here it is sufficient to point out that the relevance of Ultimate Reality—whatever it is—to questions of value is something to be established, not assumed. To invoke it at the outset is substituting a presumed answer for the question to be inquired into. It is like identifying the subject matter of physics with some special theory.

This brings us to the central issue which divides philosophers today. It is not the subject matter of philosophy which is in dispute—the quest for a set of reasonable values—but the *methods* by which values are to be established as valid. More specifically, the issue is whether or not there exists some method of testing values other than the rationale of scientific inquiry in its comprehensive sense. The rationale must not be identified with the specific methods or techniques followed in this science or that, but with the general pattern employed by any science in building up a body of reliable knowledge about the nature of things.

That Mr. Murphy believes that there are other ways of reaching true conclusions about values is obvious on almost every page of his key chapters. The "problems of men," he says, are legitimate enough as subject matter of philosophy, but any of the solutions offered for these problems must submit "to distinctively philosophical tests of clarity, comprehensiveness, and ultimacy." It is cause for regret that instead of telling us what these tests of clarity and comprehensiveness are, and how they differ from the tests of clarity and comprehensiveness in other fields, Mr. Murphy relies too

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much on the italicized words *philosophy* and *philosophically*, as if their use made his meaning clear.

It is far from clear. Does Mr. Murphy mean to suggest that philosophical method operates with canons of logical validity other than those used in the sciences? When a scientist develops a theory of space-time or of peptic ulcers, in what way is his thinking less comprehensive than that of the philosopher, assuming that the thought of both is *relevant* to their respective subject matters? How "ultimate" must ultimacy be to be philosophical and not scientific? It may be that we need to know more to test values because of the range of their interrelationships with other values and facts than we need to know to test theories in physics. But if this is a valid ground for refusing to acknowledge the critical study of values as scientific, it would also be a ground for denying scientific status to biology and psychology, whose problems are more complicated and whose findings are less accurate than those of physics.

In places Mr. Murphy seems to suggest that philosophical thinking is *logical* thinking without telling us when logical thinking is philosophical rather than scientific. Without logical thinking we cannot legitimately infer what the consequences are which follow from the meaning of our hypotheses in science. We would not know what experiments to conduct or how to evaluate their bearing. Philosophical analysis, we are told, "is simply [!] a particularly honest, penetrating, and persistent effort to think through the intent of our own half-inarticulate ideas." If so, where, oh where, does Mr. Murphy derive the impression that those who believe that "problems of men" or "the quest for wisdom" are the distinctive subject matter of philosophy propose that these problems can or should be solved without a particularly honest, penetrating, and persistent effort to think things through? What they maintain is that this thinking is not sufficiently clear, ultimate, or comprehensive unless at some point it returns to the problem from which it took its departure. It may do this in various ways and can recognize a certain division of labor in its approach. But the *direction* of the thinking must have a bearing upon a possible resolution of the problem. Thinking is not clear, ultimate, or comprehensive unless it is *relevant*. And relevance is controlled by the problems and purposes of inquiry.

I do not mean to attribute to Mr. Murphy the position of absolute idealism shared by some of his colleagues on the commission (Blanshard and Hendel). For he has elsewhere disavowed it. None the less, his words suggest that his test of the comprehensiveness and ultimacy of philosophical thinking is whether it takes note of some ultimate subject matter which, although involved in the appearances scientists study, cannot be grasped by the methods of scientific inquiry. He does not do justice to the view of the experimental naturalist that the extent of the relatedness of any specific value or set of values with the nature of things is an empirically determinable matter depending upon the context of specific problems. In contradistinction to his assertion that our conclusions can possess a "fully thought-out and comprehensive validity which only philosophy can supply," naturalists maintain any problem which is genuinely solved on any level is in so far fully thought out and possesses comprehensive validity. Once more Mr. Murphy's words seems to be shadowed by the assumption of one great problem—the existence of the universe as a whole—that can be adequately dealt with only by philosophers.

The confrontation of these two generic points of view in philosophy is not intended here as a preface to arguing for the superiority of one of them. What is proposed is a conception of the subject matter of philosophy on which philosophers can explicitly agree. In respect to where they differ it is further proposed that they recognize their responsibilities for working out and clearly stating the methods they believe appropriate in dealing with this common subject matter. The pragmatists have put their critical faith in the basic pattern of scientific inquiry. They are doing yeoman work in developing its logic, in bringing scientific hypotheses to bear on many troubled areas of life, and in removing the obstacles to its extension and free operation. If we have a more reliable method for finding truth in the field of value than the scientific methods employed in discovering truths in other fields, it is cruel to withhold the evidence from needful man.

SIDNEY HOOK

"Americanism" Misplaced

PREFACE TO AN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY OF ART. By A. Philip McMahon. The University of Chicago Press. $2.50.

THIS is a distressing book. It calls for a philosophy of art for Americans that would be "consistent with their other basic insights" and distinct from the one fostered in Europe and especially in Germany. Rational and romantic idealism, holding that the root of all phenomenal reality is the individual consciousness, produced, according to the author, an aesthetic that worshiped the genius, associated beauty exclusively with the fine arts and literature, and identified the work of art with its non-sensory "idea." Hitler was in large part a creature of the doctrine of amoral egoism popularized in Germany by romantic-idealist philosophy.

But the fault goes all the way back to Descartes with his *cogito ergo sum* and to the neo-classic writers on art; thus it is interwoven with the whole development of Western thought from Descartes to Nietzsche. It is this tradition, which culminated in the "German" philosophy of aesthetics, that is now to be rejected in favor of a new "American" one. ". . . Americans who are realists in every other department of thought have no compelling obligation to adopt in art what they reject everywhere else."

Professor McMahon's own "American" philosophy of art, relying on vaguely pragmatist assumptions, yet invoking Aristotle, quarrels with the "Europeans" for their terminological untidiness (but what harm has that done?) and limits the term "art" to the arts of design, excluding poetry, drama, music, dancing, and such other audible or kinesthetic forms, to which the Greek word for "technique," often wrongly translated as "art," does not apply. The professor also shows that works of art are partly experienced as sensory objects—which no idealist ever denied; that beauty is not to be found solely in the beaux arts—which no idealist ever asserted; and that art is to be subjected to the same logical and ethical criteria as the rest of experience. (The author

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expresses himself unclearly in this last, for I cannot tell whether he means art as an activity or as works of art. If he means that the latter too are to be made to undergo the tests of logic and morality, then his statement is beneath criticism.)

What is thus offered as an "American philosophy of art" dwindles under analysis to a mere set of assumptions long since taken for granted by "European" aesthetics. Nothing in them controverts, essentially, the main arguments of the idealist position, or advances the problems of aesthetics any farther toward solution. And certainly they do not justify the distressing talk about "alien" ideas and a "structure of the American mind."

Xenophobia might explain the tendentious obtuseness with which Professor McMahon seeks to reduce the whole basis of aesthetic thought from Descartes to the present century to a series of gross fallacies. The Western tradition of art philosophy has committed many errors, and I hold no brief for idealism, but it did greatly advance and clarify the subject. To deny these achievements and call for a return to Aristotle is obscurantism. It is characteristic of such obscurantism that it can interpret German idealism and romanticism only by taking one aspect of a philosopher's argument, stripping it of all qualifications and connections, and then deducing from that, with over-literal logic, the fallacies he is to be convicted of. Thus if a philosopher confines his investigation of the nature of the beautiful to works of art, he automatically becomes guilty of denying beauty to everything else.

Let it suffice here to point out but one instance of the way in which Professor McMahon "demolishes" the "German" school of aesthetics. He interprets Kant's statement, "Nature is beautiful because it looks like art; and art can be called beautiful only if we are conscious of it as art while it yet looks like nature," to mean that successful art must imitate nature. He then charges Kant with having contradicted himself by asserting elsewhere that "beauty has nothing to do with truth"—for how can that be if beautiful art depends on imitation? The error here is to assume, unwarrantedly, that by "looks like" (*sieht aus als*) Kant meant "mirrors," that is, that art *portrays* nature. Actually, as he explained both before and after this statement, all he meant was that the "purposiveness in its [art's] form must seem to be as free from all constraint of arbitrary rules as if it were a product of mere nature." That is, art, although it must look as though it *came* from nature, does not have to *resemble* any of the content of nature, anything already present in it. Nothing but polemical bad faith can explain Professor McMahon's failure to grasp this rather clear distinction and his subsequent complete misunderstanding of the aesthetics of Kant—than whom there has been no greater thinker on art and whose revolutionary insights into its nature go unappreciated or misunderstood even today.

"Preface to an American Philosophy of Art" is a more ominous book than its author realizes. What does he think the implications of his "Americanism" are? How can he, after having inveighed as he has against European thought, fail to realize that in railing at it as "alien" as well as "mistaken" he takes over precisely the worst that Europe has to give us?

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ROLFE HUMPHRIES

For Deflation

EDWARD H. FAULKNER'S first book, "Plowman's Folly," was a best seller in its class, and was widely praised for raising basic questions about agricultural techniques, even by those who did not fully agree with it.

In "Uneasy Money" (Oklahoma, $1.50) Faulkner has moved into economic fields with which he is obviously less familiar, and the result is disappointing. About half of the

*"Springs of Hellas and Other Essays." By T. R. Glover. Macmillan, $2.75.

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book is a repetition of arguments in favor of disking young corn or other interim crops into topsoil—instead of deep plowing. The rest boils down to a proposal for drastic deflation.

The author believes that in order to get along with the rest of the world, and to promote world trade, the United States should reduce its costs of production and its prices to the general world level. He thinks that the agricultural techniques he advocates can initiate a deflationary cycle by cutting farm costs and food prices. He is disturbed by the size of the national debt and convinced that the United States has been impoverished by World War II.

Apparently Faulkner has never encountered, or at least has never understood, the simple proposition that a $300 billion debt can be handled more easily by a nation with a $200 billion annual income than a $50 billion debt by the same nation with a $50 billion income. Yet he would probably agree that a farmer with a $4,000 income and a $6,000 mortgage is much better off than the farmer with $1,000 a year and a $1,000 mortgage.

In any case, deflation as a deliberate national policy has so little political appeal as to be scarcely worth discussing in 1946. If there is deflation, it will come as an unplanned national disaster. However, if Faulkner's agricultural techniques prove sound in practice, they may help to raise farmers' income without contributing to the inflation which a large number of farmers apparently favor today.

CHARLES E. NOYES

France in America

RESISTANCE TO NAZI BARBARISM and Vichy capitulation assumed many forms: underground, *maquis*, Fighting France. Men of French speech never forgot that the chief dignity of man, as Pascal taught, lies in his thought. To think freely, honestly, fearlessly was to their mind a way of waging war by transcending war. So a School of Higher Studies was founded in New York as an autonomous branch of the New School for Social Research. It was subsidized, out of their scanty resources, by the Provisional Government of the French Republic and the Belgian government in exile. It was staffed by French, Belgian, Swiss, Russian, Spanish scholars: French culture is not a political entity. It was directed by Henri Focillon, Jacques Maritain, Henri Grégoire, in succession. The quarterly review *Renaissance*, of which Volumes II and III are now available in one ($5.50), gives an epitome of its activities.

Like the French Pavilion at the New York World's Fair, like the beloved and ill-fated Normandie, it offers an epitome of French science and art. Deliberately it minimizes those elements which, legitimate and delightful as they may be, are only too well known. This is not an *"article de Paris."* There is nothing in it that will appeal to the *gourmet*, the *bon vivant*, the *viveur*, the devotee of *haute couture*. French civilization has often been summed up in a smile: a smile not frivolous, not malicious, not cynical, but wary and a trifle disenchanted. The contributors to this review do not smile. Indeed, they make a determined effort to be austere. They want to prove that Rabelais, Montaigne, Molière, Pascal, Voltaire, Renan, Anatole France are not the whole of French tradition: no less French were Budé, Estienne, Ducange, Benjamin Guérard, Fustel de Coulanges. This is not by any means *"le monde ou l'on s'ennuie"*; but it is even less *"le monde ou l'on s'amuse."* Their gravity, however, is not ponderous. There is a spare elegance in their scholarship. We hope the school and the review, born of the war, will survive the war. It is meet that the best of France should be present in New York, and the best of America in Paris.

ALBERT GUERARD

Latin America: The Liberal Thesis

FROM TIME TO TIME I have come across a book on Latin America which has singled itself out, amid a now declining flood of trash, by reason of its special utility or literary value. Of the dozens of such books I have read in the last few years probably not more than six have been worth dollars out of a *Nation* reader's pocket. "Industry in Latin America," by George Wythe (Columbia, $4), is definitely to be put on the shelf with that half-dozen, for its strict and admirable utility, not for any other pleasure it will give. The liberal thesis concerning the South American republics is that their advance toward a satisfactory democracy is dependent upon their developing an adequate and partially industrialized economy. In this process the attendant changes in the size and relation of classes are considered to be the effective feature. Mr. Wythe's book enables one to test the validity of that thesis and the possibilities and difficulties of its realization. The author, who is one of the ablest writers on Latin American economy, gives a survey of what industry actually exists, the conditions of its birth, present state, and future development. His book is exhaustive without being tedious, and is sober, unrhetorical, and scrupulously objective. Mr. Wythe does not concern himself with politics, and his expressed interest in foreign relations is confined to questions of international commerce. Nevertheless, not merely because it is the first all-inclusive effort of its kind but because it is so authoritative and exact, I recommend it to those who support the liberal thesis.

RALPH BATES

FICTION IN REVIEW

IT IS now seventeen years since the publication of Edmund Wilson's earlier work of fiction, "I Thought of Daisy." Seventeen years are seventeen years in whatever social or political situation, and if one's sense of time is stirred by the appearance of Mr. Wilson's present collection of connected stories, "Memoirs of Hecate County" (Doubleday, $2.50), it may be in part because of the emotions that naturally attend the contemplation of any small completed arc of experience. But there is, in addition, our awareness of the special nature of these years—an awareness sharpened by Mr. Wilson's own intense response to them. Of all critics, Edmund Wilson is perhaps most torturedly alert to the social-moral disintegration of the last two decades, to the disintegrating effect of awful political events upon our artistic life. He is preeminently the critic of our contemporary despair, to whom the whole of our present-day culture presents

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itself as the record of a hopelessly dissolving society. Distinguished for his deep roots in traditional values, he seems to draw but bitter nourishment from them. He is an instance in which a long range of profound knowledge provides none of the solace of a long-range point of view. On the contrary, his feeling about the past seems increasingly to exacerbate his feeling about the present, until—in turn—his feeling about the present sends him back to reinvestigate the past for confirmation that even in a better day disease—within the individual, if not in the surrounding world—was a natural or expectable state of sentient man.

It is so highly subjective an attitude, however accurate may be the perception of objective circumstances on which it is based—and in his criticism Mr. Wilson projects it so handsomely—that it is both futile and impertinent to argue with it; one can only state one's own dissent from it, assert one's own conviction that no matter how bad the dominant forces around us, the creative will of the individual need not be at their mercy. The fact that it is subjective does not, however, mean that it is peculiar to Mr. Wilson alone or that it does not have its clear source in recent intellectual history. For every destructive social event there are the temperaments prepared to receive its full painful impact, and a considerable section of our best-trained literary opinion operates on a similar sad recoil from the broken promises of Marxism.

Even more immediately than his recent critical writing Mr. Wilson's present volume of stories is an unhappy response to the contemporary social and cultural situation of this country. Consciously or unconsciously "Memoirs of Hecate County" is a sequel to "I Thought of Daisy": the earlier book was Mr. Wilson's record of American artistic and intellectual life in the '20's; the present book is his record of American artistic and intellectual life in the '30's and '40's. And Mr. Wilson is still as fine a social reporter as before, with a Proustian eye for typically specialized deportment. The cultural alterations he notes from these intervening years are numerous and significant; the two books together make an enormously valuable document of social change. Now, instead of Greenwich Village, the setting of Bohemia is the expensive suburbs and the East Sixties. Now, instead of the romantic lure of the theater, there is the commercial lure of Hollywood and the radio. Through Mr. Wilson's keen observation we see—as the years pass—a small private income metamorphose from security into inconsequentiality; we measure an appreciable increase in alcoholic consumption; we watch the abortive effort of the intellectual to break down his intellectual isolation and come to terms with economic and political realities; we see the transformation of important, if frenetic, sexual relationships into the cold phenomena of a psychiatric textbook. Most significant of all, we study the alteration in the author's own relation to his environment, the loss of his sense of a cohering purposeful connection with the people among whom he lives. For while it is questionable whether there was more integrity in the artistic life of the '20's than there is today, certainly there was more integration. For instance, in "I Thought of Daisy" it was still possible, if one were not oneself a member of the bohemian élite, to be made to feel an outsider at a Village party; but in "Memoirs of Hecate County" the gates of the pseudo-Elizabethan houses can be crashed by anyone with the right pretensions; it is only the narrator who, in the degree that he remembers a day of greater dedication, can himself at times feel a bit of an outsider.

And yet there is a curious contradiction in the new stories between, on the one hand, the narrator's awareness of his lack of sympathy with his social milieu and, on the other, the quality as well as the fact of his participation in it. Mr. Wilson's protagonist is a sociological critic of art, a person of taste and learning. Yet, completely free to choose a different set of associates, he appears to feel compelled to select this riffraffish company—simply because that is the most available contemporary product. That is, Mr. Wilson implies an absence of free will even in our choice of friends. But even if it were true that we are such will-less victims of the dominant environment, there would still be no need for his narrator to act as he does *within* this context. The jacket of "Memoirs of Hecate County" describes the book as the "adventures of an egotist among the bedeviled," and one must be egotist indeed to have so little heart for the stragglers and swaggerers among whom one has thrown in one's lot. Why should a group of poor devils be seen as such a group of incarnate Devils? There is a very rigid moralism in Mr. Wilson's book. The criterion by which his spokesman makes his discriminations between good and evil is so close to a religious one that we are tempted to accuse him of the very Manichean heresy—the belief that "the devil is contending on equal terms with God and that the fate of the world is in doubt"—which he himself protests in one of the stories.

Mr. Wilson's unrelenting heart is particularly distressing in his longest and central story, The Princess with the Golden Hair. This is the story which is already attaining a certain whispered fame for its supposed pornographic interest. I myself do not find Mr. Wilson's detailed sexual passages disturbing because they are daring, but I do find them disturbing because of the breach they make between sensation and emotion. As in "I Thought of Daisy," two girls divide the attention of the narrator of The Princess with the Golden Hair—a remote figure of fantasy and a real human being. And just as in "I Thought of Daisy" his encounter with the warm, proletarian Daisy has the purpose of breaking down the "dreadful isolation of the artist" which has been reinforced by the goddess-like Rita, so in "Memoirs of Hecate County" the narrator's encounter with the dance-hall hostess, Anna, is supposed to serve as a healthy counter to the worship of the fairy-tale Imogen. But the new story carries its anatomizing of reality and idealism a dangerous step farther that it was carried in the early novel. Now it would seem not to be sufficient to show that compared to the invigorating nature of reality, romantic idealism is thin stuff to feed on. Idealism—Imogen—must be shown to be morbidly diseased. But so, too, must reality—Anna—be shown to be diseased: she gives the narrator gonorrhea. There is, then, no one in either the mythological upper world or the proletarian under world to break down the artist's isolation. He is doomed by the given circumstances.

But the point is that Mr. Wilson's protagonist does nothing to improve these circumstances. His sexual relationships with Imogen and Anna are merely laboratory tests of society; and laboratory tests, whether on a high intellectual

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level or a primitive pragmatic level, are cold things compared to love. If the hero of "Memoirs of Hecate County" had loved Anna, he would have got her to a doctor as quickly as he got himself; if he had loved Imogen, he would have made a move to see that she got help for her neurotic disorder instead of grimly shutting her out of his life with the grim shutting of the textbook in which he discovered what ails her. There are, after all, ways in which we can still alter —or at least will to alter—unhappy fact.

Clearly, I do not mean this to say that it is the job of the intellectual to go about doing good in a bad world. But we do have the right, I think, to ask that he maintain, amid disorder, some principle of private order from which a principle of general order could be induced—that he keep, for example, a sound integration between his own head and heart; which, of course, is just another way of saying that he should not confuse sensation with emotion. For if he allows himself to be disintegrated by his disintegrated society, all he will generalize is mess; but if he maintains his integration within a disintegrated society, he will at least have a tragic experience, a meaningful experience of pain. And that is everlastingly the intellectual's job—to be meaningful, despite and above his social situation.

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Bertrand Russell, the distinguished philosopher, mathematician, logician and Freethinker, recently said that he enjoyed writing booklets for E. Haldeman-Julius because he is given the fullest freedom of expression. In fact, it is only in essays written for Haldeman-Julius that Dr. Russell can give circulation to the mind-liberating thoughts he feels should be made known to the average person. Most standard publishers are afraid to issue works that are frowned on by the orthodox and conventional. Such a restriction is never encountered in the editorial department of the H-J Publications. In the booklets listed below Dr. Russell offers a feast of reason, information, logic, wit and rollicking humor. We present:

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Music

B. H. HAGGIN

THE old Victor set of Beethoven's Piano Concerto No. 1 offers the solo part in the first and last movements with the exciting musical life created by Schnabel's sharply contoured inflection—but this in a characterless orchestral context. In the new Victor set (1036; $4.50) the exciting life is in the orchestral context created by Toscanini with the NBC Symphony around the flow of characterless piano sounds produced by Ania Dorfman. It is true that inflection like Schnabel's cannot be done in fast tempos like Toscanini's, which make those two movements marvelously light and buoyant, but which also make it difficult for a pianist to do much more than get in all the notes. But Dorfman's playing is just as characterless in the slow movement, in which, on the other hand, Schnabel's excessively slow pace and his phrasing destroy the contours that Toscanini makes so clear, the continuity that he makes so strong. We are told that the new performance was recorded in Carnegie Hall; and this is made credible by the beauty of the reproduced sound of piano and orchestra. The sound of the old Schnabel performance, I might add, is surprisingly good.

Victor also gives us Toscanini's powerful performance of Beethoven's "Coriolan" Overture with the NBC Symphony (11-9023; $1). On the second side of my copy treble and bass are well-balanced and the sound is clear and bright; on the first side, however, bad balance makes the sound muffled on top and heavy and unclear down below. If the defects of the first side are not the result of faulty recording (and I don't think they are, if only because I don't think Toscanini would have approved the recording if he had heard those differences between the two sides in the first test-pressings) then they are the result of faulty manufacturing process and other things which look no better to the public's eye: my copy may be one of those pressed from a particular defective stamper; and if so these copies either were not detected by inspection, or, if detected, were not withheld from sale.

The new recording of Berlioz's Symphonie Fantastique by Monteux with the San Francisco Symphony (Set 994; $6.50) has provided an occasion for me to hear the work again for the first time in several years, and to be newly fascinated by the Berlioz mind as it reveals itself in the wonderfully original Berlioz language and thought. The performance is excellent; and the records reproduce it with richness, clarity, and spaciousness, but with some alteration of its original plastic proportions by monkeyed-with volume-levels, and with bad distortion in the drum-rolls on the last side of the third movement.

Though I prefer a performance that corresponds to the composer's blueprint, I am open to conviction by one that departs from it. Where a composer's thought is as subtle as Debussy's I think it wise for a performer to adhere strictly to the detailed and precise blueprint that Debussy provides for its realization; but I would not mind E. Robert Schmitz's ignoring or doing the opposite of what Debussy directs if by so doing he produced something valid in its own way. What I object to in his performances, of the first volume of Debussy's Preludes (Set 1031; $5.75) is that they are unimaginative and insensitive. And also that they are pianistically incompetent: no music, and least of all Debussy's, can be played with such heaviness and crudeness of attack and sound, such slovenliness of execution. These faults of the playing, finally, are made worse by the recording.

I don't like to hear Chopin played in the excessively mannered style of Horowitz's performances of the Andante spianato and Grande Polonaise Opus 22, the Valse Opus 34 No. 2, and the popular A flat Polonaise Opus 53 (Set 1034; $3.50); but as something achieved on the piano the execution of that style—the precise chiseling of the fine gradations of beautiful sound—is breath-taking. And it is marvelously reproduced by the records. The Polonaise Opus 53 also is issued on a single (11-9065; $1).

In the Menuhin-Landowska performance of Bach's great E major Sonata (Set 1035; $3.50) the tempos are ponderously over-deliberate, Menuhin produces an inflated and coarse tone unmitigated by any stylistic inflection, and Landowska pounds away in her present gigantesque fashion.

On a single (11-9025; $1) are Brailovsky's performance of Liszt's charming Valse Impromptu in A flat, excessively mannered in spots, and a performance of Liszt's "La Campanella" which produces its fireworks with brilliance.

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Letters to the Editors

Professor Schuman Protests

Dear Sirs: For writers of books to review what is written about their books by book reviewers is usually in bad taste. Debate *de gustibus* is particularly painful when the author is in general accord with the political outlook and social objectives of the reviewer. I trust, therefore, that Dr. Niebuhr will be indulgent if I suggest that his comments on my "Soviet Politics" in your issue of February 23, interesting and valuable as they are, have so little to do with the book as to convey a wholly misleading impression of its scope and purport. When a book on Russia by a *Nation* contributor receives a more accurate and adequate review from William Henry Chamberlin in the Chicago *Tribune* than it receives from Dr. Niebuhr in *The Nation*, an author's postscript is in order.

Careless misquotations are scarcely helpful. I did not write that "the Russian adventure . . . was reared . . . amid the excitement of vast adventures," etc., since I do not thus abuse the English language nor, ordinarily, does Dr. Niebuhr. I did not write that "no such development [that is, the reorientation of Soviet policy toward world revolution] is possible." My word was "probable," which is quite different. I did not evaluate Soviet art and science in terms of "productivity" per man-hour but in terms of "striking accomplishments." I did not limit my discussion of the future of Western democracy to "a single sentence," but to some thirty pages, all listed in the Index under "Democracy." I plead innocent to the charge of "not adequately explaining" my reasons for regarding world government as possible and necessary in the atomic age. The matter is dealt with at length, with further references in the Notes.

Dr. Niebuhr's chief complaint is that I do not understand or discuss freedom and democracy or the extent to which and the ways in which political liberty has been sacrificed to economic security in Soviet society. Yet more than a hundred pages of the book are devoted to precisely these issues, a fact easily ascertainable from the Table of Contents. Dr. Niebuhr writes: "If genuine liberty has been sacrificed [in the U. S. S. R.], we ought to know about it." This, so help me, is exactly what much of the book is about. I am not persuaded, moreover, nor will readers of the book be easily persuaded, that my understanding of freedom is inferior to Dr. Niebuhr's. He has obviously no obligation to accept either my conclusions or my premises. But he might properly be deemed to have a duty of seeing what is in the book and of not seeing what is not in the book.

Since no one would guess the fact from the "review," it may be useful to point out that "Soviet Politics" is a detailed and documented history and reinterpretation of the Russian Revolution, the Soviet state, the Communist Party, and the course of Soviet foreign policy before, during, and since World War II. Its value, if any, is for others to judge. But it is difficult for readers to judge a book review which nowhere indicates what the book is about. And it is even more difficult for a reviewer to judge a book without reading it, though some critics do indeed attempt the task, lest knowledge of the contents inhibit criticism. I doubt, however, whether Dr. Niebuhr ought to engage in this practice or whether *The Nation* ought to encourage it.

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN

Williamstown, Mass., March 4

Dr. Niebuhr Replies

Dear Sirs: If an author cannot resist the temptation to challenge a critical review of his book he ought at least not to indulge in the hackneyed charge that the reviewer has not read his book. I thought, and still think, that I gave a pretty good account of what Dr. Schuman's book is about, though I must confess that my review does not do justice to the imagination and verve with which he makes history live. Had I, however, done full justice to his earlier chapters on Bolshevist history, I would have been compelled also to be critical of his psychoanalysis of Trotsky, which seems to obscure rather than clarify the age-old conflict between the absolutist, Trotsky, and the statesman-relativist, Stalin.

On specific points: I did not criticize the author for devoting a single sentence to the problems of American democracy but rather to giving a single sentence to the idea that a mixed economy is a solution for those problems. I stick to that, with the additional observation that I was not particularly critical of his economy. I merely mentioned it.

On the question of making "productivity" the criterion of the adequacy of Soviet art, I am afraid I will have to quote him just a little more fully and let the record stand. Professor Schuman writes: "Foreign critics readily conclude that the Soviet intelligentsia is in helpless bondage and consists of sycophantic automatons, reduced to complete sterility. Nothing could be further from the truth. No government anywhere at any time has done more than the U. S. S. R. to promote art and science by providing facilities for work and publication, and by giving scientists and artists economic security through regular salaries and generous rewards. This policy has paid dividends by the striking accomplishments of Soviet music, drama, cinema, literature, as well as the biological and physical sciences. Yet all contributors have lacked 'freedom in the Western sense.' And as freedom is commonly viewed in the West as the *sine qua non* of productivity, the enigma of Soviet culture seems to many quite inexplicable." The word "productivity" is his and not mine. The full quotation also reveals that Professor Schuman believes that a government subsidy of art and artists is a refutation of the idea that the government exercises undue influence upon the artist. I can imagine no more revealing non sequitur.

Even with appendices Professor Schuman gives only a sketchy account of his confidence in the possibility of world government. I must say that he does this more adequately in some of his other writings. But if Professor Schuman wants to bring up that point he might prompt a very long review of all his books, showing that he has a bewildering habit of ascending to the most rarefied heights of constitutional idealism and then descending to the depths of *Realpolitik* without giving the poor reader a chance to adjust himself to the different levels.

Having indulged in these polemics, I could wish that I had given a "soft answer that turneth away wrath." For, after all, the book is very good. I

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Crossword Puzzle No. 154

By JACK BARRETT



ACROSS

1 Bold undertaking that seems to record a reward
6 Always rises to the top
10 Or cages? Victorian women must have thought so!
11 Man over the others
12 Inns here (anag.)
13 Mythical figure in Welsh tradition after whom the English named a table water!
15 Not sub rosa
17 I've no tail (anag.)
19 Is avenged (anag.)
21 L C
23 Girl I care for
24 The "Garden of Italy"
27 "But they while their companions slept Were ------- upward in the night"
28 Notorious Neapolitan secret society
29 A bad thing to fly into
30 Went to look for a sheep, had a 57-year nap, woke up, went on looking for the sheep

DOWN

1 Engrave
2 This Roman comic poet might be *Irish!*
3 Straight part of the stream between bends
4 What's the editor doing going over the manuscript again? (hyphen, 2-7)
5 "Laugh, and the world laughs with you; -----, and you sleep alone"
7 I bar Mac (anag.)
8 Served in the Scottish church?
9 I sent Moe (anag.)
14 Do write your girl one! (two words, 4 & 6)
16 What Abel Tasman discovered in 1642
18 A pocket-companion (hyphen, 4-5)
20 Masking
22 Coupling-rod of a locomotive (hyphen, 4-3)
24 Not a helping hand (two words, 3 & 2)
25 Gee this is ham!
26 They simply beam on us

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE No. 153

ACROSS:—1 DEBUT; 6 EASEL; 9 HAILING; 10 IDLER; 11 GLAZE; 12 UNICORN; 16 GREASE; 19 EOLITH; 22 CHALLENGE; 23 PLEA; 24 EIRE; 25 DISHCOVER; 26 ANTI; 27 EVIL; 28 A LONE STAR; 31 BORNEO; 33 ENSIGN; 36 ATOMIST; 39 LOBES; 40 LOINS; 41 EPISODE; 42 HELMS; 43 RATEL.

DOWN:—1 DOING; 2 BULGE; 3 THRUSH; 4 MIMI; 5 DIDO; 6 EGGNOG; 7 SPAHI; 8 LEECH; 13 NEAT'S-FOOT; 14 COLD CREAM; 15 RENOVATES; 17 ROLANDO; 18 ACADIAN; 20 LEERERS; 21 TURNING; 29 LEASES; 30 ANTLER; 31 BELCH; 32 REBEL; 34 IDIOT; 35 NASAL; 37 OHIO; 38 IRON.

should think a not too sensitive author would have gathered that the reviewer intended to convey that impression.

REINHOLD NIEBUHR

New York, March 6

R. S. V. P.

Dear Sirs: A group of public-spirited citizens in Rhode Island has formed a Rhode Island Citizens' Political Action Committee, which is affiliated with the national Citizens' P. A. C., and cordially invites *Nation* readers and progressive citizens of Rhode Island who are interested in working for the P. A. C. to join. Membership chairman is Milton Paisner, 706 Pontiac Avenue, Cranston.

MILTON PAISNER

Cranston, R. I., March 1

Lucky Strike Means—

Dear Sirs: The strike of the 2,500 women cigar makers against the American Tobacco Company is getting to be an "American" scandal. On March 14 these women had been walking the picket lines 150 days! All they are asking for is a 25-cent raise—and from a company whose sweatshop tactics have netted it more than $20,000,000 yearly.

The best offer made so far by the company was a 7-cent raise—and this to women who now make only 52 cents an hour ($20.80 for a forty-hour week).

Need I say that these women need help? Money sent directly to the office of the Food, Tobacco, Agricultural, and Allied Workers of America, 1505 Race Street, Philadelphia, Pa., will reach them, as will money sent to the National Citizens' Emergency Committee to Aid Strikers' Families, in New York City.

KARL KORSTAD

Philadelphia, Pa., March 17

RESORTS

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